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Abstract
A Security Framework for Routing Protocols
Nitin Prajapati
With the rise in internet traffic surveillance and monitoring activities, the routing
infrastructure has become an obvious target of attack as compromised routers can
be used to stage large scale attacks. Routing protocols are also subjected to various
threats such as capture and replay of packets that disclose the network information,
forged routing control messages that may compromise a connection by deception, dis-
ruption of an on-going connection causing DoS attacks and spreading of unauthentic
routing information in the network. Presently, strong cryptographic suites and key
management mechanisms (IPsec and IKE) are available to secure host-to-host data
communication but none of them focus on securing routing protocols. Today’s rout-
ing protocols use a shared secret to perform mutual authentication and authorization,
and depend on manual keying methods. For message integrity, they either rely on
some built-in or external security feature that uses the same shared secret.
The KARP working group of the IETF identified that the work is required to
tighten the security of the routing protocols and demonstrated that automated key
management solutions are needed for increasing security. Towards this goal we pro-
pose the RPsec framework. RPsec provides a common baseline for development of
KMPs for the routing protocols, supports both automated and manual key manage-
ment, and overcomes the weakness of existing manual key methods.
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The Internet has become an important part of our everyday life. The number of ser-
vices offered on it have benefited our society in various fields such as communication,
education, medicine, business, banking, media and more. At the same time, it has
made us dependent on its availability. It would be hard to imagine a world without
the Internet.
The Internet is a global network. It is composed of many small sub-networks,
inter-connected with each other to offer global connectivity. The services offered on
the Internet can be accessed from any part of the world. However, to use an online
service we need a way to reach to it.
Just like commuting in the real world for going from one place to the other,
accessing services on the Internet also needs commuting. It is not us who commute
but the requests that are sent to the online services that we want to access from
our network devices (mobile handsets, laptops, PCs, etc.) that are connected to
the Internet. In this case, our device becomes the source and the online service is
the destination somewhere on the Internet. Finding a path from the device to the
service on the network is the task of the routers. A router runs a routing protocol
to identify the adjacent routers that are connected to it. Then, it determines how to
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inter-connect the separate networks to form the Internet.
A router finds a suitable path to a requested (online) service by using the “for-
warding table” that has been built by the routing protocol(s) running on it.
Assuming that the service you want to access is available online, a router will
always be able to find a suitable path to it, of course, with the help of the routing
protocols. The routers route your request to the online service via this path. Similarly,
the service sends a response to your request, but in this case, the destination is your
device and the server is the source address. This is how we get access to the online
services on the Internet.
We refer to an online service by name, e.g., www.example.com, but the routers do
not refer to the services by this name. They need to know where the service resides on
the Internet. With the help of the other support services, the service name is resolved
into an Internet Protocol (IP) address. An IP address is the location identifier on
the Internet, just like a regular real world address. However, these other support
services are reachable only because some routing protocol has provided their location
information and the router has suitable paths to these services. Clearly, the routing
protocols play a key role in providing the online services.
There are various threats to the routing protocols that can disturb the routing on
the network. For example, a rogue router can alter the path (misdirect the packets) or
make a copy of a packet and re-use it later in a malicious way. Directly or indirectly,
these threats affect the availability of the online services. Depending on the type
of service, its unavailability can affect one or more organizations and their users at
various levels (for example, economically, if a banking/business service).
Therefore, it is important to ensure that all the routers on a path are legitimate.
It is also important to ensure that the contents of the routing protocol exchanges are
valid (i.e., that the sending router has the right to share the information). There are
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security mechanisms available to secure the routing protocol from the kinds of threats
noted above. These mechanisms range from as simple as using a password to strong
cryptographic algorithms to secure the routing protocol exchanges. Once configured,
these mechanisms protect the routing protocol exchanges.
Unfortunately, although security mechanisms are defined for most routing proto-
cols, the configuring of the routers with the information that defines the parameters
for the secure exchanges is today a manual process. The operators must manually
configure the security mechanism for each routing protocol running on the routers in
their network, in accordance with their organization’s security policy.
This manual method of configuring security presents some security and deploy-
ment issues. Firstly, because of the need for manual intervention, once a security
mechanism is configured, it is hardly ever changed. It is known that many organiza-
tions have been using the same configuration for over 5 years [28]. The prolonged use
of a single security mechanism presents significant security risk. There are various
ways to gain access to the security information configured on the router and utilize
it to disrupt the normal functioning of the network [32].
Secondly, the lack of staff makes it hard for the operators to change the security
mechanisms on all the routers in their network at the same time [27]. Therefore, it has
become an operational practice to use the same security for a routing protocol across
all the routers in the network. Thus, the lack of staff for carrying out such a large
change in the network has become a major deployment issue. One way to overcome
this problem is to use a solution that can address the configuration/distribution as-
pects of the security mechanisms for the routing protocols. However, there is no such
solution available to address this issue for routing protocols. Lastly, since each router
is manually installed and configured with the security information, mere possession
of the security information is assumed to imply that the router is a valid participant
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in the network. There is at this time no effective mechanism that can be used to (in-
dependently) validate the router in a network. It is necessary to validate the router’s
participation in the network to assure that a potential attacker has not connected to
the network without authentication. An attacker can stage large scale attacks if he
is able to connect to the network without authentication.
The Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Working Group [1]
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) was established to identify solutions
to these problems. The Working Group has developed guidance for those working on
security for routing protocols, and has proposed solutions for automatically generating
the keys to be used. However, they have not addressed the issue of validating the
adjacent routers in the network, nor have they proposed any solution for the issue
of managing the credentials that are needed to validate a particular router. In this
thesis, we present a solution that addresses these problems. We call this solution
“Routing Protocol Security” (RPsec).
The use of RPsec may benefit an organization economically by reducing the need
for a large security staff. The use of RPsec solves the deployment problem currently
faced by the operators, by enabling them to perform regular revision of keys or other
security parameters. The use of RPsec will reduce the exposure of the routing pro-
tocols to the existing security risks. Given its ease of deployment, it provides an
incremental approach towards a more secure Internet.
The rest of the thesis is organized in 10 chapters as explained below. Chapter 2
covers the background information of routing protocols and the associated security
mechanisms. Chapters 3 and 4 cover the IETF standard key management mechanisms
and the existing work that is going on in developing the key management protocols, an
alternative to present manual methods, for the routing protocols, respectively. Chap-
ter 5 explains the standard protocols that will be used for the proposed configuration
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and distribution mechanism. Chapter 6 discuss the motivation behind this work and
explains the actual problem. Chapter 7 sheds more light on the solution proposed in
this thesis. Chapters 8 and 9 contain in depth explanation of the RPsec framework.
Chapter 10 explains the proposed architecture for the configuration/distribution of
security mechanisms and some examples of using RPsec. Chapter 11 is the concluding
chapter of our thesis.
Apart from these chapters, there are 6 appendices. Appendices A, B, C and D
describe the YANG modules that we have developed for the RPsec. Rest of the




The agenda of this chapter is to discuss about the existing IETF standard security
protocols in Section 2.2 and categorize routing protocols from a security perspective
in Section 2.4. Then we discuss the generic threats to routing protocols in Section 2.5
and present security solutions used by routing protocols in Section 2.6.
2.1 Common Terms and Definitions
Hash function– A function that maps an arbitrary length of data to a fixed length
string. In cryptography, the hash functions that are one-way and collision resistant,
are used to calculate the message digest. One-way means it is impossible to find
a message given its fixed length string representation. Collision resistant means its
computationally infeasible to find any two distinct messages that produce the same
output string.
Message Digest (MD)– It is the output of a hash function that accepts a variable
length message and processes it (iteratively, using some defined algorithm) to generate
a condensed representation of that message is called a message digest. The message
digest protects the integrity of the message. Any change to the message will also
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change its message digest value [4].
Message Authentication Code (MAC)– The output of a hash-function that uses a
secret key and a fixed-size block of data to produce a cryptographic code called
message authentication code. This code is appended to the end of the original message
before the transmission. This cryptographic checksum is calculated such that any
change to the message after its calculation can be detected. This is possible because
both the sender and the receiver of the message use the same secret key to calculate
the MAC. The purpose of a MAC is to authenticate both the source of a message
and its integrity [3].
Key Management Protocol (KMP)– Also known automated key management protocol
(AKMP), “is useful for allowing simple, automated updates of the traffic keys used
in a base security protocol. KMPs replace the need for manual management of keys
and allow for periodically updating the key’s on running systems. It also removes the
need for a chain of manual keys to be chosen or configured on such systems. When
configured properly, a KMP will enforce the key freshness policy among peers by
keeping track of the keys lifetime and negotiating a new key at the defined interval”
[27].
2.2 IETF Standard Security Protocols
2.2.1 TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO
TCP-MD5 This option was primarily used for protecting the communication of
BGP routing protocol over the network using the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
The MD is calculated over the TCP segment and a shared secret known only to
communicating ends. The receiving end recalculates the message digest of the TCP
segment including the shared secret and compares it with received signature. Any
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discrepancy will result in the rejection of the segment without sending a response.
This provides protection against false connection resets and against segment spoofing
or replay attacks by including the shared secret in calculation of message digest and
associating sequence numbers with each segment. The use of this option is not nego-
tiated rather, its use is dictated by the security policy for the communicating peers.
The TCP-MD5 specification discusses nothing about the management of shared keys
for BGP peers [33].
TCP-AO It was introduced to replace the TCP-MD5 [39]. It supports the use
of stronger HMACs, provides increased protection against replay attacks (even for
long-lived connections as it has increased size for the sequence number field) and co-
ordinates key rollover between end points within a connection, i.e., without dropping
the active connection. It is based on specification of master key tuple (MKT) and
calculation of traffic keys for one or more TCP connections.
A MKT stores security parameters to be used to generate traffic keys and dictates
the use of these keys for a connection. TCP-AO is used to secure BGP and LDP
routing protocols. More information on TCP-AO can be found in [39].
2.2.2 IPsec
The Security Architecture for IP, a.k.a. IPsec, is designed to protect traffic at layer
3 (OSI) or Internet layer (TCP/IP). It provides interoperable, high quality, cryp-
tographically based security for IPv4 and IPv6. It provides services such as access
control, connectionless integrity, data-origin authentication, and detection and rejec-
tion of replays of the packets using two protocols, Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [26].
The IPsec supports two modes of operation—transport mode and tunnel mode.
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Both of these modes are actually the operational modes supported by the AH and
ESP protocols. In transport mode, the security is provided to the next layer protocols,
e.g., TCP and UDP. In tunnel mode, the whole IP packet is encapsulated in a new
IP packet that is protected by AH or ESP.
The IPsec defines three databases—Security Association Database (SAD), Secur-
tiy Policy Database (SPD) and Peer Authorization Database (PAD)—for effective
specification of the security services it offers. It also has an optional automated key
management mechanism—Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (Section 3.1.2), for dynam-
ics Security Association (SA) establishment [25]. Below we discuss the role of these
databases in IPsec:
SPD All the security policies for the incoming and outgoing traffic are dictated in
the SPD. Each policy entry is identified by a Security Parameter Index (SPI) assigned
to it at the time of configuration. The SPD entry contains the parameters used to
identify the traffic (traffic selectors), the desired security protocols (AH or ESP) that
should be used in order to protect that traffic and the operational mode of the IPsec.
SAD For effective protection, IPsec mandates establishment of an SA between the
communicating peers. An SA in IPsec can be established manually or dynamically.
Irrespective of the method used, all the SAs are stored as entires in the SAD. Effec-
tively, it contains the final security parameters (as specified in the SPD corresponding
to the SPI) that are used for securing the IP traffic. The applicable SA for the pro-
tected traffic is identified using the SPI. Each SA is pointed to by a corresponding
SPI in SPD cache that is used to establish it. The SPI itself is enough to identify an
appropriate SA for unicast communications. However for the multicast communica-
tion, it can be used in conjunction with the source and destination addresses of the
packet to identify the most appropriate SA.
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PAD The PAD provides the link between the SPD and key management protocols
(KMP). It contains all the necessary parameters that are used for identification,
authentication and authorization of each IKE peer or group that communicates with
this IPsec entity.
In summary, the IPsec creates a boundary between the unprotected and the pro-
tected side of a host or a network. The traffic crossing this boundary is subjected
to various checks to find the appropriate behavior (protect, bypass or discard) as per
the security policies in place. Once the behavior is identified, the information from
the SAD is used to protect the traffic as desired.
2.2.3 Multicast IPsec
Multicast IPsec is a little different from unicast IPsec. In multicast communication, a
packet is sent to multiple destinations (one-to-many). This group of peers is identified
using a group identifier in GPAD (Group PAD). The role of GPAD is similar to IPsec
PAD but is specifically used for group authorization. For that the GPAD requires an
explicit specification of a group identifier (GroupID) that uniquely identifies a mul-
ticast group. The GPAD is used by only a group key management protocol (GKMP,
Section 3.2) to provide authorization services for the multicast group corresponding
to the GroupID [42].
A multicast IPsec entity needs to identify the incoming and outgoing multicast
traffic separately. This is because the multicast IP address can never appear in
the source address field of an IP protocol packet. Since each sender may also be a
potential receiver of the multicast traffic, the “directionality” is explicitly specified in
group SPD (GSPD) entry for each traffic. This information was not required for the
unicast IPsec because the source and destination addresses are swapped to represent
the direction of the traffic. The directionality field allows to specify the traffic as
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sender-only, receiver-only or symmetric.
The GSPD can be used to support both unicast and multicast security policies [42].
One shortcoming to multicast IPsec is that the SA cannot be negotiated. It can
only be assigned for a group by some central controller or some group key management
protocol. Multicast IPsec is used for protocols such as PIM-SM [6].
2.3 Common Routing Protocol Functions
All the routing protocols share the following functionality to achieve routing and
network reachability in a network–
Neighbor and Adjacency Management A router provides a way to reach to its
directly connected networks. However, the networks that are not directly connected
to it, can only be reached via some other router(s) that connects to those networks.
Identification of such routers or neighbors is the first step to determine the network
layout. The routing protocols need to know adjacent routers and then establish and
maintain the neighbor relationships with them. Each routing protocol defines a set
of parameters that should be met in order for a peer router to become its neighbor.
The set of these parameters is called the peer eligibility criterion. Each routing pro-
tocol has implicit mechanisms to check for this criterion. The routing protocols thus
establish and maintain neighbor relationship(s) with routers that qualify according to
the eligibility criterion. The messages used for neighbor discovery and maintenance
are called routing protocol’s control packets.
Different routing protocols use different approaches to find and maintain neigh-
bors, usually they fall under one of the following:
• Simply broadcast/multicast the update packets. These packets are sent to rout-
ing protocol’s broadcast/multicast address, where the potential neighbors must
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be running the same routing protocol to process these update packets. Other
routers/devices simply drop these packets.
• Search/maintain neighbor adjacency using “hello” packets. Hello packets also
serve as keepalive messages that are sent at regular intervals to insure that the
neighbor is up and running. If keepalives are not received for a certain period
of time, the neighbor is declared unreachable and the routing protocol send
updates to other peers to spread this information.
• Manual configuration of neighbors. For example, BGP cannot dynamically
search for its neighbors. The manual configuration of neighbors is used by the
routing protocols as soon as their instances are up and running.
Once the neighbors are discovered, routing protocols share the network reachability
information.
Network Reachability and Routing Information Maintenance Routers run
routing protocols to exchange the information about the directly connected networks
as well as to process the network information they receive from the neighbors. Each
router uses this information to create a forwarding table. The router uses the forward-
ing table to route all the traffic passing through it onto the network. The messages
carrying routing information from peer routers are called routing protocol’s data
packets.
Routing Transports The routing protocols perform all the above functions by
transmitting messages to the router’s neighbors (or potential neighbors) using some
underlying transport protocol [8]. For example BGP uses TCP, RIP uses UDP, and
OSPF and PIM use IP as transport protocol. Another important thing to note
is that each routing protocol defines its own message format. These messages are
12
then encapsulated in the transport protocol before being transmitted on the network.
Usually these messages are link-local, i.e., they are not forwarded by a router.
Security Aspects Since the routing protocols play an important role in connect-
ing isolated/partitioned networks, it is necessary to protect the message exchanges
between them. Present day routing protocols use a shared key (or a shared secret)
to ensure that the peers are authenticated and authorized to talk to them, and to
protect the integrity of the messages exchanged between them. For message integrity,
it either relies on some built-in or external security feature.
It should be noted that confidentiality is not desired for routing protocol messages
because encryption may increase the time it takes to create and maintain the routing
table. Also encryption may obliterate the concept of priority/critical routing protocol
messages that must be processed before other messages.
2.4 Classification of Routing Protocols
As discussed previously, a routing protocol needs authentication, authorization and
message integrity for securing its communication with the peer(s).
Authentication insures that the peer is “who it says it is”. Authorization means
the peer is allowed to communicate with this routing protocol entity. Message in-
tegrity insures that the message sent by the peer did not change in transit.
Presently, routing protocols use shared-secret among devices to perform mutual
authentication and authorization. The shared key is also included in message digest
calculation to verify the source of the message. However, the methods of authenti-
cation and authorization for any routing protocol are dependent upon the following
factors:
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Communication Model The routing protocols can send messages to its peers
using following communication models:
One-to-One It is also known as unicast communication. In this type of com-
munication the source address and destination address in the packet belong to the
devices at either end of the communication. In unicast communication, both the
participants can be the sender and the receiver of the messages. For example, routing
protocols such as BGP and OSPF on NBMA networks.
One-to-Many Multicast communication follows this type of communication
model. It is different from the unicast communication in that the source address
belongs to a sender of the packet but the desitnation address belongs to a group of
hosts. This group of hosts is actively listening for any packet with the destination
address set to the multicast address that uniquely identifies this group. In multicast,
a host may be sender-only, receiver-only or both. Sender only means the host is the
transmitter of information. Receiver only means the host only receives the informa-
tion but never transmits it. In the third type, the host is the sender as well as the
receiver of the information transmitted by its peers belonging to the same group. For
example, routing protocols such as OSPF on broadcast networks and PIMs use this
communication model.
Key Scope From a routing protocol’s point of view, the key scope for a key defines
the limit on the use of that key in the network. The key scope from a KMP’s point
of view describes the way that key should be configured, negotiated or distributed
for use on the devices in the network. In general, there are two types of key scope as
follows:
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Peer Keying In peer key scope, the key is unique between two routers running
unicast routing protocols. From a KMP’s perspective, the key in this scope needs to
be configured on or negotiated between two peers.
Group Keying In group keying, the key is shared and used by multiple routers
simultaneously. Group keying exists for routing protocols using multicast and broad-
cast communications [27]. From a KMPs perspective, the key in this scope needs to
be configured or distributed among the members of the multicast group.
An in-depth discussion on key scopes and its effect on key management can be
found in [38].
2.5 Threats to Routing Protocols
Routing protocols are subject to various threats as follows [8]:
• Threats at the routing transport level.
• Attacks on the messages that carry control information (adjacency and peering
information).
• Attacks on the messages carrying network information.
At the routing transport level, an attacker may attack the routing transport subsys-
tem to disrupt the routing protocol message exchanges. An attacker may capture and
replay the routing protocol control packets that are used for searching neighbors and
adjacency management. An attacker may infuse incorrect information in the routing
protocol data packets that contain the network reachability information. Such attacks
are intended to deceive the routing protocols, i.e., spread bogus routing information
in the network. This could also lead to the disclosure of routing information and dis-
ruption in network services. An IETF working group, Secure Inter Domain Routing
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(SIDR), is working on ensuring authenticity of information in the routing protocol
data messages. These attacks may have following consequence on the overall network
as identified in [8]:
• Disclosure: An attacker will gain more understanding of the network infras-
tructure if he is able to successfully capture the routing protocol packets. Such
information may help in mounting a large scale attack against an organization’s
network.
• Deception: If a legitimate router is said to be deceived if it fails to check the
authenticity of the forged messages and believes it to be authentic. A forged
information can infuse incorrect or insecure routes in the network.
• Disruption: An attacker can disrupt the normal functioning of the routers in
the network. This can be done by inserting, corrupting, replaying, delaying or
dropping routing messages or by breaking routing sessions between legitimate
routers.
• Usurpation: It happens when an attacker is able take control of a legitimate
router and services running on it. Such a compromise can be used to various
advantages and to harm a user or organization on a large scale.
An attacker can mount such attacks on the network from a close proximity or by
taking control over the router from some remote location. Therefore, it is extremely
important to authenticate the router participation in the network as well as reviewing
the security policies at regular intervals.
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2.6 Security Mechanisms for Routing Protocols
Most of the security solutions for routing protocols are based on calculating message
digest or HMACs over the routing protocol packet and a shared secret that is used
to identify the source of the message. This is because the routing protocols require
only peer authentication and assurance that the message sent by the peer has not
changed in the transit. RIPv2, OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 have a built-in mechanism called
authentication trailer. BGP and OSPFv3 depend upon the transport subsystem TCP
and IP, respectively, for securing message exchanges.
Table 1 below, classifies the routing protocols based on their security type. We
Routing Key Communication Security Standard
protocol scope type feature
BGP Peer keying Unicast OoB TCP-AO
RIPv2 Group keying Multicast Built-in AT
OSPFv2 Group keying Both Built-in AT
OSPFv3 Group keying Both Built-in AT
OSPFv3 Group keying Both OoB IPsec
PIM-SM Group keying Multicast OoB IPsec
Table 1: Classification of routing protocols
Legend- AT:Authentication Trailer; OoB:Out-of-Band; Both:Unicast and Multicast
discuss more about the available security solutions in the following sections.
2.6.1 Built-in security
In this section we discuss about the most commonly available built-in security mechanism—
Authentication Trailer (AT).
AT is the message digest or HMAC calculated over the routing protocol message
including the shared secret. This is attached at the end of the routing packet before
transmitting over the network. The receiver of the message detaches the AT from the
message and recalculates the digest over the rest of the message. If the calculated
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digest matches the AT, then message is believed to be received from an authenticated
source unchanged.
RIPv2 The original RIP specification [7] suggests to use password authenti-
cation or keyed-MD5 security. The RFC4822 [5] specification updates the RIPv2
cryptographic authentication by adding support for the SHA family hash algorithms
in place of keyed-MD5 for increased security.
The processing of the packet depends on the type of hash-algorithm (SHA or
keyed-MD5) chosen for security that is identified by the key identifier in the packet
itself. The resultant MAC is attached at the end of the routing protocol packet.
RIPv2 security specification supports key rollover by allowing configuration of
multiple SAs on each peer [7]. The key management for RIPv2, however, relies upon
manual configuration or some private (vendor specific) key management method.
OSPFv2 The cryptographic authentication for OSPFv2 dictates the use of a
shared secret key to verify a message digest that is tagged at the end of the OSPF
packet before transmission [33]. It is the same as calculating message digest over the
routing protocol packet and shared key as discussed in RIPv2. OSPF also supports
SHA family of hash functions for increased security compared with MD5 [11].
The shared secret is never sent over the network in clear text thus provides security
against passive monitoring. An OSPF SA has a set lifetime. Thus multiple SAs can
be configured with overlapping lifetimes to facilitate key rollover.
It should be noted, however, that neither specification does indicates any standard
key management method. It is safe to say that the security association management
is based on either manual configuration or some type of vendor specific method.
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OSPFv3 RFC6505 offers OSPFv2-like authentication trailer security for OSPFv3
protocol [12]. This specification extends the OSPFv3 packet formats to include an
AT option bit and authentication data, to afford the authentication trailer.
The SHA-family of hash functions are supported by this specification. Like other
AT solutions, OSPFv3 also uses a shared secret among its members for verification
and authentication of data. This specification also offers configuration of more than
one SA with overlapping lifetime parameters for smooth transition from an old SA
to a new one.
OSPFv3 also has a security specification using IPsec which is discussed in the
next section [18].
As in others, this solution also lacks use of any automated mechanism for key
management thus relying on some vendor-specific or manual key management solu-
tion.
2.6.2 Out-of-Band security
The out-of-band security mechanisms for routing protocols are provided by the rout-
ing transport protocol. BGP depends on TCP for security while both OSPFv3 and
PIM depend upon IP for security. As discussed in Section 2.2, TCP provides two
options TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO for securing BGP. The IPsec protocol is used for
securing OSPFv3 and PIMs.
BGP The BGP uses TCP as its transport protocol. TCP is a reliable transport
layer protocol (OSI layer 4) that provides end-to-end data delivery.
The TCP-MD5 SA simply specifies the use of a shared secret when calculating
the message digest for TCP-segment and provides an incrementing sequence number
for each BGP packet sent over the network. This sequence number is used to provide
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protection against replay attacks. TCP-AO on the other hand consists of one or
more MKTs as SA between BGP peers. TCP-AO offers more security features using
MKTs as compared to TCP-MD5. In that, it specifies use of strong MACs, increases
the length of sequence numbers for protection against replays even for long lived
connections and facilitates key-rollover within an ongoing connection [39].
TCP-AO manadates generation of four unique keys for a BGP connection out
of which only three are used at either end depending on who initiated the TCP
connection. These traffic keys are used to calculate the MAC of individual TCP
segments. TCP-AO supports use of static MKTs and explicitly recommends use of
external key management mechanims [39].
OSPFv3 OSPFv3 uses IPv6 as its routing transport and IPsec is used to secure the
OSPFv3 messages [18]. As OSPF uses both one-to-one and one-to-many communica-
tion model (Table 1), using a key management protocol poses a challenge for OSPF
protocol. For key management, the specification RFC4552 mandates using manual
keying and only symmetric SAs are configured among OSPF peers for securing group
communication [18]. It also suggests use of group key management protocols if/when
available.
PIM PIM uses IP as its transport mechanism. RFC4601 and RFC5796 specify
IPsec for securing PIM’s link-local messages. Both AH and ESP can be used to
protect PIM’s link-local messages [17], [6].
PIM is protected using multicast IPsec with manual keying. However, use of
automated key management is suggested if/when available.
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2.7 OSPF Security Overview
Table 2 shows the IETF standard security protocols for both–the OSPFv2 and the
OSPFv3 routing protocols.
OSPF Version Security Protocols Standard
OSPFv2 Keyed-MD5 RFC 2328
OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512 RFC 5709
OSPFv3 IPsec RFC 4552
OSPFv3 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512 RFC 7166
Table 2: IETF standards for OSPF security
OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 use IPv4 and IPv6 as their transport subsystem, respec-
tively. RFC2328 is the specification of OSPFv2 that suggests the use of Keyed-MD5
for its security. Later, RFC5709 introduced use of HMACs for its security. HMACs are
considered more secure compared to MD5. The steps for computing the HMACs are
similar to the steps for computing MD5, only the security algorithms have changed.
RFC2740 is the original specification of OSPFv3 that suggests use of IPsec for
security. RFC4552 standardized the use of IPsec for OSPFv3 security. RFC5340
replaced RFC2740 as a new specification for OSPFv3 routing protocol. However,
among the various changes, the security considerations of OSPFv3 are not changed.
As discussed in Section 2.6.1, OSPFv3 also have an AT-like security option initially
suggested in RFC6506. RFC7166 replaced RFC6506 and is the current standard for
an AT-like security for OSPFv3. Among all the changes, the steps for calculating
the AT remains the same as in RFC2328. Let us discuss OSPFv2 security. OSPFv2
has 3 choices for the security built into its framework [33]—null authentication, sim-
ple password authentication and cryptographic authentication. Null authentication
means no authentication. The OSPF packet is sent as it is on the network. The
use of this option is not recommended. In case of simple password authentication,
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each OSPF packet contains a password in clear text. The same password is used for
all the packets. Clearly, not a secured choice. In cryptographic authentication, one
can choose between Keyed-MD5 (RFC2328) and HMACs (RFC5709). Presently, the
operators manually configure the choice of the security protocol. It could be any one




In this chapter we give a brief introduction to key and security association manage-
ment. Then we discuss existing IETF key management standards. Lastly, we discuss
the present key/SA management method for the routing protocols and the need of
the KMPs for the routing protocols.
The term key and SA management refers to the establishment of a set of keying
parameters that is required to use some cryptographic algorithms. These crypto-
graphic algorithms are used to provide security services such as authentication, con-
fidentiality and integrity to important information shared in the unsecured network
environment [10]. The protocol that performs key and SA management is called a key
management protocol (KMP). KMP is also referred to as automated key management
(AKM) protocol.
The way a KMP performs the key management tasks depends upon the type of
communication model (as discussed in Section 2.4) it serves. There are two types of
KMPs—unicast KMP and group KMP. The unicast KMPs establish SAs for unicast
communication and the group KMPs (GKMP) for group communications. We discuss
existing unicast KMPs in Section 3.1 and group KMPs in Section 3.2.
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3.1 Unicast KMP
Unicast KMPs follow a simple one-to-one communication model. In that, the SAs
are negotiated and established between two devices only. Separate SAs may be es-
tablished for more than one unicast sessions between two peers. Similarly, multiple
security associations may be established for each adjacent peer. In the following
sections we discuss the IETF standard unicast KMP solutions.
3.1.1 ISAKMP/IKEv1
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) defines
the procedures for authenticating a peer, creation and management of Security As-
sociations, key generation techniques, and security from denial of service and replay
attacks [31].
ISAKMP provided a clear separation of SA management from the details of key
exchange. A separate specification describes key exchange mechanism called Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) for it [19]. This separation was to allow many different key
exchange approaches to ISAKMP. It provided a common set of attributes required
for establishing SA for AH/ESP security protocol between two peers.
It works in two phases. The first phase provides peer authentication and au-
thorization, and establishes an SA to protect phase 2 communication. The phase 2
communication is used to establish SAs for other data security protocols. ISAKMP
describes various payloads that are used in these phases to establish and maintain
SAs. The security domain of interpretation (DOI) for ISAKMP described in [35]
identifies the situations when a particular ISAKMP payload and associated attributes
will be used and how it will be interpreted for securing IP traffic. The key exchange
mechanism for ISAKMP is described in the Internet Key Exchange [19].
For consistency—the security domain of interpretation for ISAKMP [35], ISAKMP
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[31] and IKE [19] together are called Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1).
Therefore we will refer to ISAKMP and associated support references as IKEv1
throughout the rest of this document.
3.1.2 IKEv2
The original Internet Key Exchange is specified in IKEv1 as discussed above.
IKEv2 included major changes that were learned from operational problems of
IKEv1 [25].
Like IKEv1, it establishes SAs for AH and ESP security protocols between two
peers in two phases—IKE SA INIT and IKE AUTH exchanges. In IKE SA INIT ex-
change, the IKEv2 peers negotiate security parameters for the IKE SA, and exchange
the values required for key derivation. In IKE AUTH, the IKEv2 peers use a derived
secret to prove their authentication and set up an SA for AH or ESP security protocol.
IKEv2 is simple, more reliable and is not compatible with its predecessor. Most
of the key management protocols described in this thesis use the services of either
IKEv1 or IKEv2 for authentication and authorization purposes. From here onwards,
any reference to IKE should be treated as IKEv2 unless specified otherwise.
3.2 Group KMP
The GKMPs provide group key and SA management for peers communicating in a
group. In that, the GKMP provides secret keys for each group for which the device is
a member. A device thus maintains secret keys for each group it is participating in.
Unlike unicast KMPs, keys and SAs cannot be negotiated in group communication.
Instead, the SAs are assigned externally and then shared among the group members.
The GKMP-Specification [22] and GKMP-Architecture [21] together specify an
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architecture for GKMPs. Other specifications, MSEC-GKMP-Architecture [9] and
AAKM-RP [38] provide multicast security architectures for group key management.
All these architectures describe common roles and responsibilities for the devices par-
ticipating in GKMP operations as follows:
Group Controller (GC): A group controller has the authority to generate, dis-
tribute and rekey (an act of replacing an old key with a new key) cryptographic keys
for a multicast group [22]. It is the responsibility of GC to ensure that each par-
ticipant is valid and posses correct cryptographic key that is being used for group
communication. A group controller should also be a valid participant in order to
perform this role.
Group Member (GM): A valid participant who is not acting as a GC is a group
member [22]. The group members assist the GC in creation of keys, request and
accept group keys and perform mutual authentication to validate each other. A GC
is also a GM.
Group Controller Key Server (GCKS): A GCKS is a network device that gener-
ates and distributes group keys and group security policies for one or more multicast
groups. Its functions are similar to that of a GC. The GCKS is an important com-
ponent in a multicast security framework architecture described in [9]. The terms
GCKS and GC are used to refer to the same thing. We will use the term GCKS for
consistency.
Policy Server (PS): A policy server stores the security policies for various multicast
groups in a network environment.
In the next sections we describe the IETF GKMP standards.
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3.2.1 GDOI
Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) is a group key and SA management protocol
that adheres to the mulitcast security architecture described in [9]. It is based on
the ISAKMP DOI and extends ISAKMP payloads for group key management [31].
GDOI has two phases of negotiation. The first phase uses the ISAKMP phase 1
procedure, which provides authentication, authorization and an SA that is used to
protect the phase 2 exchange. It defines two new protocols—GROUPKEY PULL and
GROUPKEY PUSH—that provide phase 2 exchange for group key management. The
GM uses GROUPKEY PULL to retrieve group SA (GSA) from a GCKS. The second
protocol is used by the GCKS for rekeying the existing SAs.
3.2.2 GSAKMP
Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP) provides a security
framework for managing cryptographic keys for group communication [20]. It is used
to protect multicast application data.
GSAKMP assigns the same roles and responsibilities to the devices as discussed
in Section 3.2. However, it also introduces the notion of a Group Owner (GO). The
group owner is responsible for creating the security policy rules for a group. The
GCKS’s role is to perform key management operations by adhering to the security
policy received from GO. GCKS also enforces the security policy on all the GMs as
dictated in the policy. For effective security both the GCKS and the GM mutually
authenticate each other before any key management related exchanges take place.
The GCKS validates the GM’s request by making sure that the GM is listed as a
participant in the group it requested. The GM on other hand validates that the
GCKS is authorized to represent the group it requested to join.
27
GSAKMP also provides an optional distributed key management architecture us-
ing a subordinate GCKS. The subordinate GCKS’s role is to provide scalability and
administer the distribution of the security policies in a large network.
3.3 Present Key Management and Need of KMPs
At present, the key/SA management for the routing protocols is done manually. In
that, the operators configure the key/SA on device-by-device basis. The operators
often face the following problems with manual key/SA management—
• Dependency on manual keying methods only. No automated key management
protocol is available for the routing protocols.
• Manually accessing and configuring SAs on routers implies the authenticity of
the device in the network.
• Manual method of changing the key/SA cause a router to drop the active con-
nections with its peers.
• Change of SA in one router means changing SA in all the neighboring routers.
• As a drawback of manual method, the operators have to configure one SA per
routing protocol. The same SA is configured on all the neighboring routers
configured to run that routing protocol.
• Manually accessing each router and changing the keys/SA is a labor intensive
task.
• Also, the lack of staff makes it difficult to implement such changes across the
network.
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These problems demonstrate the need of KMPs for routing protocols. In previous
sections, we studied the standard unicast and group KMPs. Accordingly, a KMP
automates the key/SA negotiation and establishment. It authenticates a peer before
starting the key/SA negotiation. A KMP also provides automatic key/SA rollover,
rekeying and renegotiation of the SAs. But, all these standards lack one thing–support
for the cryptographic protocols that are used to secure the routing protocols. It is
because these standards were not built for the routing protocols, but for IPsec.
Some of the existing security solutions for routing protocols either specify the need
of an external key management mechanism or simply leave it to the implementers to
use manual or private key management solutions. This calls for a management scheme
that can allow the operators to perform the key/SA management for all the routers




In Chapter 3, a need for KMPs for routing protocols is identified. The agenda for
this chapter is to discuss the existing/on-going work in the KARP working group of
the IETF to fulfill that need.
4.1 KMPs For Routing Protocols
The existing work on developing KMPs for routing protocols relies upon the KMP
solutions discussed in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. The sections below provide a brief
introduction to existing work towards developing KMPs for routing protocols.
4.1.1 RKMP
Negotiation for Keying Pairwise Routing Protocols (RKMP) [24] describes a mech-
anism to secure the unicast routing protocols using IKE. The focus is exclusively
on unicast routing protocols such as BGP, which uses TCP as its primary routing
transport. The premise for this work is based on the fact that the key management
for the unicast routing protocols today is limited to static configurations.
Towards this goal, RKMP provides modified IKE payloads to add support for
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TCP-AO. As with IKE, the RKMP works in two phases. The first phase is the same
as the IKE phase 1 exchange. The second phase—RP AUTH—is similar to IKE’s
IKE AUTH exchange but uses the extended IKE payloads.
RKMP is effectively an extended IKEv2 that supports authentication of rout-
ing protocols and also cooperates with a key management database such as CKT
(discussed in Section 4.2) for storing the negotiated SAs for routing protocol.
4.1.2 G-IKEv2
Group IKEv2 (G-IKEv2) proposes a group key management approach between a
GCKS and a GM using IKEv2. It adheres to the multicast security architecture
described in [9].
G-IKEv2 has a minimum of two exchanges IKE SA INIT and GSA AUTH. The
IKE SA INIT exchange is the same as IKEv2 phase 1 exchange. The GSA AUTH
exchange however has more features than the IKE AUTH in that it also provides
options for group member registration and group authorization. One key difference
between GSA AUTH and IKE AUTH is that group SAs are not negotiated but are
downloaded from the GCKS to the GM.
G-IKEv2 is an easier, reliable and a robust protocol, which is intended to replace
GDOI. It is indeed a GDOI version 2 which is better in performance than its pre-
decessor because it requires fewer message exchange(s) to establish a group security
association.
It should be noted that G-IKEv2 does not provides an authentication list of peers
for adjacency management because it is not made for securing routing protocols. It
also assumes that the identity of an existing GCKS in the group will be provided
by some external mechanism. Section 4.1.4 explains such a process that is used to
dynamically elect a GCKS in a group.
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4.1.3 G-IKEv2-MRKM
The G-IKEv2-MRKM is known as G-IKEv2 for the Mulitcast Router Key Manage-
ment. It proposes the use of G-IKEv2 to protect routing protocols such as OSPF and
PIMs, between a group of network devices [40].
More specifically it proposes extensions to G-IKEv2 payloads that carry group
security policies. It advocates to include the support for routing protocols specific
security protocols and tranforms in G-IKEv2 policy payloads. The MRKM supports
use of both static GCKS configuration and dynamic election of GCKS as suggested
in the next section.
4.1.4 MaRK
MaRK stands for Multicast Router Key Management. It proposes a key management
method for multicast routing protocols. It defines a group protocol for establishing
and managing symmetric keys for multicast routing protocols. It also provides an
election protocol for GSA management protocols that may also be used for protocols
such as G-IKEv2 and MRKM.
The election process uses a GCKS priority number defined for each GM. A high
number means higher chances of becoming a GCKS. The elected GCKS listens for
the group-join requests from the GMs for the groups it manages. This protocol needs
at least two phases to download a GSA from GCKS to GM. The first phase uses the
IKE SA INIT and IKE AUTH to establish mutual authentication between a GCKS
and a GM. In the second phase, the GCKS processes group join requests from GMs
and performs group key management functions.
It has features similar to G-IKEv2 and is intended to be used for security of
routing protocols involved in a group communication.
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4.2 Cryptographic Key Table
The cryptographic key table database, also known as crypto-key-table (CKT), is a
standard conceptual database of long-lived cryptographic keys intended to be used
by many different routing protocols for securing routing information exchange [23].
It is designed to support both manual and automated key management methods.
The standard aims to provide a simplified specification of keys, security protocols and
associated key derivation functions (KDF) for routing protcols while allowing differ-
ent implementation approaches to use this database. There is a similarity between
SAD and CKT. The SAD database is built to store security associations for AH and
ESP security protocols that are used to protect IP traffic. Similarly, the CKT fo-
cuses on storing SAs for all the security protocols that are used to protect routing
protocols. The CKT has achieved it by its generic design, which allows storage of all
the important information required to use any security protocol available for routing
protocols.
The CKT also specifies the conventions for the representation of keys and identi-
fiers such that all the implementations represent the information in the same way. The
keys stored in CKT are called long-lived keys. The implementations are required to
use this key to generate traffic keys specific to the communication wherever required.
However, it does not constrain the direct use of the long-lived keys if required.
4.3 Routing Authentication Policy Database
Routing Authentication Policy Database (RAPD) [44] provides a concept of a database
that provisions policies for KMPs for routing protocols and uses CKT for storing
negotiated keys and security associations. The RAPD also provides for authorization
policies that contains information to validate peers. We extend the RAPD’s concept
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in this thesis.
The RAPD provides peer/group authorization information, specifies KMP/manual
method and cryptographic protocols for establishing SAs for routing protocols. It
provisions security policies that a KMP can use to negotiate a most preferred SA
for a routing protocol. The overall use of RAPD is similar to IPsec’s SPD and PAD
databases. A KMP mechanism for routing protocols may utilize the security policies
and authorization information provided by the RAPD to secure the routing protocol
communication.
Several organizations of RAPD are possible. It can be implemented with two
different databases for incoming and outgoing policies or, as a single database that
contains all the (symmetric) security policies and authorization information. The
third type of organization is to divide it into two databases similar to SPD and PAD
in IPsec.
The third type of RAPD organization is illustrated in this thesis. Two databases
are specified—Routing Peer Authorization Database (RPAD) and Routing Security
Policy Database (RSPD)—that together with the CKT reproduce an IPsec like se-
curity framework for routing protocols. Chapter 8 explains in detail about these two




The agenda for this chapter is to present a brief introduction to NETCONF, YANG
model and PYANG, a YANG model validator.
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [16] and YANG [13] are IETF
standards for network configuration management. The former is a configuration
management protocol and the latter is used to model the data managed by NET-
CONF [41].
5.1 NETCONF
NETCONF is an IETF standard for network configuration management. It provides
a basic set of operations for installing, manipulating and deleting the configuration of
network devices [16]. It follows the principle of the client-server architecture and pro-
vides simple remote procedural call (RPC) based operations such as get, get-config,
edit-config, copy-config, delete-config, etc., to configure, edit and delete the config-
uration data of network devices. It uses Extensible Markup Language (XML) based
data encoding for configuration data and protocol messages. It provides multiple
logical data-stores such as writable-running, startup and candidate data store. These
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data stores represent the state of the configuration data in a device [16]. Each of
these data-stores can be configured independently, locked and unlocked to ensure
safe manipulation and consistency of the configuration data.
It has all the features that are required for remote configuration management,
clearly a protocol made for configuring network devices.
However, it had lacked a specific data modeling language that can be used to
model the configuration and the state data, the RPC calls and notifications. This
forced the vendors to develop private solutions (mostly XML based) that can closely
meet the NETCONF operation requirements. The closest match to the NETCONF
protocol type functioning can be achieved using XACML.
5.2 XACML
XACML stands for extensible access control markup language. The XACML is an OA-
SIS standard to define a core schema and corresponding namespace for the expression
of authorization policies in XML against objects that are themselves defined in XML.
XACML defines two things that are important from NETCONF’s perspective. It
defines an XML schema for defining a network information, syntax of requests, access
control policies and responses [36]. This can be used to implement the NETCONF
RPCs and notification functions. Secondly, it specifies how a request from the policy
requester should be processed and replied to, by a policy distribution system [36].
XACML allows defining new nodes (data or configuration) in the existing schema.
Thus network data types such as IP address, port number, device identity and other
management relevant parameters can be defined when required.
It is based on XML, which can be used to express a wide range of policies. While
such scope is desired, it presents a problem of reaching a general consensus [30] Also,
it was found that different vendors had developed a different data modeling approach
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in XML to meet NETCONF requirements. Thus, the solution using XML lacked
uniformity across the network community [30].
The NETCONF like functionality can be achieved in XACML using XML schema
definition (XSD). “While it was a viable solution it had some limitations: The XSD
is used for modeling of arbitrary XML documents while NETCONF needed modeling
management commands, notification, management information and related behavior.
Then defining XSD is complex and is not readable enough for general population” [30].
Thus the IETF came up with a more appropriate easy to read but more effective
data model for NETCONF—YANG data model.
5.3 Data Modeling Language
Data modeling languages are used to develop and specify configuration data for the
managed systems. The data models are used by the policy developers and the network
operators for managing network services.
It is imperative to choose an appropriate data model for the security policies
that provides an easy and concise format to express policies, and benefits both the
implementor and the reader or the network operator managing those policies.
5.3.1 XML
Section 5.2 explains why using XML as a data modeling language for NETCONF is a
less appropriate solution. The aim is to use the data model that can be easily under-
stood by the creator, reader and implementor of the security policies. Towards this
goal, the IETF developed Yang data modeling language for NETCONF as explained
in the next section.
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5.3.2 YANG
YANG is a heirarchical and modular data modeling language for NETCONF. It is
also used to specify NETCONF-based operations (RPCs, e.g., get, get-config, edit-
config, copy-config, delete-config, etc.), configurations, state data and notifications. It
models heirarchical organization of the data as a tree, where each node has a manda-
tory description. Further, data can be structured into modules and submodules. The
modules are reuseable, extensible and importable in other modules (similar to includ-
ing external libraries in programming languages). It provides a set of built-in types
and allows for defining the new types/derived types from the built-in types. The new
types can be further used to derive other dervied types. It allows for constraining
the form of data such as appearance, value and condition based processing of data.
Its beauty lies in the fact that it is not mandatory to use the YANG representation
itself as it can be translated into an equivalent YIN (YANG Independent Notation)
notation which can be parsed using any standard XML parser. YANG also supports
versioning of modules to indicate that changes are made to the module. It organizes
its data into nodes, leaf nodes, leaf-list nodes, container nodes and list nodes. It
allows for easy distinction between state data and configuration data [13].
5.4 PYANG
PYANG is an extensible YANG validator, transformater and code generator written
in Python. It is used to validate YANG modules and used to convert YANG modules
into equivalent YIN, YANG, DSDL and XSD formats. It can be integrated in other
applications to generate equivalent codes corresponding to the module [2]. PYANG
is free open source tool available for the YANG model validation at [2]. A similar
tool written in Java—jYang is also available now which provides the same features
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as PYANG [2]. We choose PYANG to validate the YANG modules that are used to




In this chapter we will understand the existing layers of security management for
the routing protocols. We will also identify the deficiencies in these layers that have
motivated the work done in this thesis.
6.1 Security Management Framework
Figure 1 shows a possible security management framework for the routing protocols.
Let us discuss the layers in the figure in detail.
Layer 1 is the routing protocol layer. All the routing protocols discussed in Chap-
ter 2 exist on this layer. The routers run routing protocols among themselves to
collect and distribute topological information for the network. The routing protocols
distribute the network information by “exchanging messages” with the peer routers
(neighbors). Each router processes all the information received from the routing pro-
tocol peers to create and maintain the forwarding table. This forwarding table is used
to decide where to forward a particular packet when it arrives.
Layer 2 represents the security mechanisms (Section 2.6) available for a routing
protocol. All the relevant security mechanisms have been discussed in Chapter 2. A
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Figure 1: The present security management framework for routing protocols
routing protocol needs to be assured of two things about the messages that it receives
from its peer routers:
1. that the peer is legitimate, and
2. that the message from that peer has not been altered in transit.
The most common approach today is for a routing protocol to use a pre-shared key for
authorizing its neighbors as well as for validating the message integrity. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the security mechanisms calculate the HMAC/MD using this key for
each routing protocol message that is sent and received by the router. Any modi-
fication to the message will change its digest and thus, the routing protocol/router
can detect and discard the corrupt message. In effect, all the neighbors (running the
same routing protocol) that possess this key are authorized to communicate with each
other.
The configuration of keys/SA, the choice of keys and the security mechanism
used for a routing protocol depend on the key management methods at Layer 3. As
discussed in Section 3.3, the network operators use the manual key/SA management
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method, which is the only solution that is available at this time for routing protocols.
For this reason, the operators face various deployment problems. The operators
configure keys/SA for a routing protocol by manually accessing each router in the
network. This is a highly labor-intensive task when there is a large number of routers
in a network. There is no flexibility for the operators to specify more than one SA
per routing protocol. Changing the SA of a routing protocol requires change in all
the routers that run that routing protocol. Also, a change in the SA drops the active
connection. To avoid this, operators must change the SA simultaneously across all
the routers in the network which is impossible to achieve manually.
These limitations demotivate the operators from performing regular key/SA man-
agement for the routing protocols. According to the report in [28], the operators are
using the same key/SA throughout the network for over 5 years. A capable attacker
can successfully perform cryptanalysis to obtain keys, security protocol and other
relevant information in this duration. It is also known that passwords to access the
routers are sold in the underground economy [32]. If an attacker gains access to this
information, he will be able to compromise the security of the routing infrastructure.
As we learned in Chapter 2, any router that possesses the keys/SA is allowed to
participate in the network operations. Therefore, an attacker can use a rogue router
to participate in the network operations undetected. At this point, an attacker may
also stage attacks such as spoofing, man-in-the-middle attack and distribute false
routing information among routers. Therefore, the operators should perform regular
SA management to avoid information leakage due to cryptanalysis attacks and from
other sources who exposed the sensitive security information to the world. KMPs
can be used to mitigate these threats, as discussed in Section 3.3. There is work in
progress to develop KMPs for the routing protocols (discussed in Chapter 4), but
no concrete solution has been standardized yet. Clearly, the routing protocols are
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exposed to security risks at Layer 3.
Layer 4 focuses on the configuration and the distribution aspects of keys/SAs for
the routing protocols. Presently, configuration of routers is done on a device-by-device
basis, by physically or remotely accessing the device. There is no easy-to-use solution
that controls all the aspects of the key/SA management for the routing protocols
in a network. In fact, there is no information base that allows specification of all
the keys/SAs for the routing protocols at one place. Since the information base that
needs to be managed is missing at Layer 3, there is no way to control the management
aspects of keys/SAs for the routing protocols. Therefore, there is no mechanism
for the remote configuration and distribution of the keys/SAs across the routing
infrastructure. Practically, there is no 4th layer in existing security framework.
6.2 Problem Statement
Below we identify the exact requirements that are needed to enhance the security of
the routing infrastructure.
1. The need for KMPs for the routing protocols.
2. The need for structured management information that can be used for the
development of the KMPs.
3. The need for a management scheme for the configuration/distribution of keys/SAs
for the routing protocols.
In 2012, the KARP working group of the IETF was established to address these issues
for the routing protocls. The working group analyzed the current security practices
for selected routing protocols and identified the need for stronger cryptographic mech-
anisms (Layer 2), KMPs for routing protocols (alternative to manual method at Layer
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Figure 2: RPsec and security management framework
3) and a reusable architecture framework that can be used to address the issues related
to manual methods. Some work has been completed to strengthen the cryptographic
mechanisms and some work is in progress for developing the KMPs, but no work has
been done in other areas.
The first requirement noted above is being addressed by various working groups
within the IETF, so no further discussion will be given on this point.
The second requirement specifies the “identification and structuring of manage-
ment information of the keys/SAs for the routing protocols”. The idea is to identify
the common information for the KMPs functionality, routing protocol security and
structuring of that information for the management of the keys/SAs for the routing
protocols.
We propose a “Routing Protocol Security” (RPsec) framework towards this re-
quirement. The RPsec will provide the administrators with the ability to specify
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validation data for router authentication and multiple keys/SAs for the routing pro-
tocols. The administrators can also specify the lifetime of each of these parameters
so as to avoid prolonged use of a SA in the network. The RPsec provides a way to
provision all the important information required for the management of keys/SAs for
the routing protocols. The KMPs are expected to use RPsec for their functionality.
This will modify the Layer 3 of the current security framework, as shown in Figure 2.
The third requirement states the need for a key/SA management scheme that the
operators can use to manage all the above information (authentication data, keys and
SA, and associated lifetimes) for the routing protocols without expending too much
efforts and big staff for it. We propose a solution for the configuration/distribution
of the RPsec at Layer 4. In that, we provide yang modules that describe the common
structure and types of the information managed in RPsec, and an architecture for
configuration/distribution of RPsec. Overall, we have tried to cover the deficiencies
at layers 3 and 4, respectively.
6.3 Management Information
In this section we list the most important security parameters that are required for a
KMP’s functionality and the security of the routing protocols.
6.3.1 Mandatory requirements for KMP functionality
The KMPs perform following functions—peer validation, negotiation of security pro-
tocols, and deriving/establishing traffic keys for secure communication between peers.
The RPsec provisions following security parameters that are required to support
the above functionality of KMPs:




2. Information required for security protocol negotiation-
-List of security protocols supported by routing protocols.
-List of cryptographic algorithms (transforms) associated to these security
protocols.
3. Information required for deriving traffic keys for secure communications-
-Master key, which is used to derive the traffic keys.
-Key derivation functions (KDF) used for deriving traffic keys from the
master key.
6.3.2 Security parameters for routing protocols
After careful study of routing protocol security mechanisms (Section 2.6), we have
identified the following security requirements in common:
1. Authentication data to validate routing peers.
2. Security protocol and associated transforms to integrity protect message ex-
change.
3. Keys that are used with the transforms to generate message authentication
data.
4. A key derivation function (KDF) to derive traffic keys complying to the security
protocol’s requirement, if any.
5. A master key that may be used to derive keys or can be used directly as a traffic
key.
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6. Lifetime of traffic keys.
This common information is collected after a careful study of the SA requirements of




In previous chapters, we identified deficiencies at layers 3 and 4 in the present security
framework for the routing protocols.
To overcome those problems, we proposed the RPsec framework. The RPsec is
designed to overcome the deficiencies noted in the present security framework for
routing protocols.
The RPsec provisions the management information (Section 6.3) in its component
databases. The RPAD, the RSPD and the CKT are the component databases of the
RPsec framework as shown in the Figure 3. The arrangement of RPsec databases is
similar to the arrangement of PAD, SPD and SAD databases in IPsec framework as
shown in Figure 3. This type of modular design supports the development and use
of the KMPs.
The RSPD provisions the cryptographic security protocols for the routing pro-
tocols. It also allows the operators to configure multiple security options for the
routing protocols. A KMP solution must negotiate the security protocols specified in
the RSPD.
The CKT provides the master key, KDFs and other parameters that are used for
securing the routing protocols. Each entry in the RSPD has a corresponding entry in
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Figure 3: Similarity between IPsec and RPsec
the CKT database.
Finally, the RPAD provides information required for peer authentication and links
the RSPD and a KMP solution. The use of a KMP facilitates the separation of
the authentication and the authorization. In that, the router’s participation in the
network is authenticated using information in the RPAD while the CKT provides
the session keys for authorization. Together these databases are known as RPsec
databases. In addition, each database allows specifying the lifetime for data stored
in it. Thus, administrators can precisely control the use of SAs among the routers.
The RPsec modifies the present security framework for the routing protocols.
Figure 4 shows the way RPsec can be implemented as a management module for
the key/SA management of the routing protocols at Layer 3. The layer 4 shows a
yang module corresponding to each RPsec database. The yang modules are used to
structurally represent the data stored in RPsec databases. The NetConf protocol can
be used to remotely configure and distribute the RPsec databases to each router in
the network. Then we propose a configuration/distribution architecture for RPsec in
49
Figure 4: Integration of routing security management framework and RPsec
Chapter 10. We also describe two cases that exemplify the use of RPsec.
7.1 Goals/Benefits
The goal of the RPsec is to provide a common base line for the management of the
keys/SAs for the security of the routing protocols. Its modular design leaves the
scope of adding more featured elements when required. However, such additions will
be described as an update to the basic specification. It contains the list of all the
essential elements that are required for the proper functioning of the KMPs and the
security of the routing protocols at one place. Such an standardization of information
has following advantages -
• The administrators can specify the SAs for all the routing protocols in the RPsec
databases.
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• It defines a standard information base for each KMP developed for a routing
protocol. Each KMP will use the information available in these databases.
• It allows development of more specific solutions as per the requirement of a
routing protocol. The additional requirements can be added as a separate spec-
ification to this standard.
• The yang module of each database can be modified, extended and reused. It
standardizes the representation of information in the RPsec. The modules can
be also be added with new features incrementally.
• Its modular design provides increased support for development and use of KMPs
for the routing protocols.
• Lastly, the yang modules provide the opportunity to develop multiple configu-
ration/distribution mechanisms using the NetConf protocol. A vendor can still
develop their unique solutions using the architecture suggested for remote con-
figuration/distribution of the RPsec databases. Such a mechanism will resolve
the problems faced due to manual methods (discussed in Section 3.3).
7.2 Novelty
RPsec is a security framework only for routing protocols. It represents an effort to
increase the security standards for the routing protocols. The novelty of our work is
that we have provided a framework that addresses multiple problems that are faced
by the present security practices of routing protocols. We provide a KMP support
module at Layer 3. However, it is designed such that it can also be used without
the KMPs (i.e., the RPsec parameters can be installed manually). This is the only
solution that allows operators to specify the SAs for all the routing protocols in
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the network at one place. Then we have provided a standard representation for each
RPsec database. These modules can be used with the most popular NetConf protocol
for the remote configuration and distribution of SAs for routing protocols. The RPsec





In this chapter we discuss the RPsec design objectives, overview, scope of usage and
the way RPsec can be integrated with the current security framework of the routing
protocols.
8.1 Design Objectives
Below we present the design objectives for the RPsec.
• The RPsec is designed to separate protocol-specific aspects from both manual
and automated key management. The RPsec aims to support the cryptographic
protocols that are used to secure the routing protocols.
• It should be easy to specify multiple security options for a routing protocol and
adaption of a new, more secure protocols should require minimum changes to
the existing implementation. The idea is to provide rich security options for
the routing protocols, when available. The implementors will need to develop
an interface for the interaction between the security mechanisms and the RPsec
such that the routing protocols can use the security mechanisms as per the
53
policy set in the RPsec.
• Multiple routing protocols should be able to consult these databases for their
security needs via some interface. However, implementors will need to develop
interfaces so that routing protocols can consult the RPsec for security. The
router (or some process in the router) will provide such interface for each routing
protocol that intends to use the RPsec.
• The framework should be implemented such that multiple KMPs can use it.
8.2 Caveats and Assumptions
RPsec is a framework that supports the use of the KMPs for the routing protocols. To
achieve its objectives, we assume that the KMPs and the routing protocols will use this
framework for security via “some interface”. Through out this text we have/will use
the term interface among routing protocols, associated security mechanisms, KMPs
and RPsec. The implementors will need to develop such interfaces to interact with
the RPsec. We assume that such interfaces exists or will exist in future. As per [27]
and [28], it is understood that the use of RPsec like solutions will require some
change to the implementations of existing routing protocols. It is assumed that
any new routing protocols that will be developed will use the RPsec by default.
The effectiveness of the RPsec will depend on the way KMPs utilize its databases.
However, in cases where KMPs are not desired, RPsec’s manual method shall be used.
The security of routing protocols depends on various factors. No single solution
can provide absolute security to routing protocols. The work in [34] describes a multi-
fence defense framework for routing protocols and RPsec fits in the “Cryptographic
Protection Schemes” of that framework. According to it, the RPsec will provide for
secure neighbor-to-neighbor communication, authentication and authorization.
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In the next section, we point out how RPsec is not a KMP and the desired level
of diversity that RPsec should offer in the choice of security protocols for the routing
protocols.
8.2.1 Difference between RPsec and KMPs
The function of a KMP is to negotiate and establish desired SA between the routing
peers. Each KMP defines its own message format and procedures to support this
functionality. RPsec provides data that the KMPs will carry in their messages. For
example, for initial authentication of peers the KMP will refer to the RPAD for
authentication data. After the authentication, the KMP will refer to the RSPD to
negotiate which security protocols to use. The successful negotiation will finally result
in an SA that is stored in the CKT. The routing protocols will use this SA for security.
Upon reaching the expiry of the keys/SA, some process will trigger the KMP’s rekey
mechanism. For example, in IKE the initiator (the local/remote IKE peer) requests
IKE for rekey of existing keys/SA. The concerns regarding re-keying, renegotiation
are responsibility of the KMP in use. Towards this functionality, each entry in the
RPsec has a set lifetime. The lifetime information should be used to trigger the
re-keying/renegotiation.
When a GKMP is used with the RPsec, a GCKS will be responsible for rekeying
and renegotiation of the group keys/SAs as explained in Section 3.2. In case of using
the RPsec without a KMP, the interface between the routing protocols and the RPsec
and/or between the security protocol and the RPsec will keep track of the lifetimes
of the keys/SAs. The interfaces will bear the responsibility of rolling over to the use
of new keys/security protocols.
Therefore, RPsec provides a standard baseline for the development of KMPs for
routing protocols. All the KMPs (developed specifically for the routing protocols)
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must use the RPsec framework for consistency.
8.2.2 Support for diverse security protocols
Figure 5 shows the diversity in the security mechanisms of the routing protocols as
discussed in the Section 2.6. From the figure, we can see that the built-in security
Figure 5: Security protocols of RPsec
mechanisms and the TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 for the routing protocols append the au-
thentication data to the routing protocol packets before transmission on the network.
In case of IPsec security, we have two modes of operation–transport mode and tunnel
mode. In transport mode the IP packet is modified to use the AH protocol. The AH
protocol provides protection to both the IP header and the routing protocol packet.
In the tunnel mode, the original IP packet carrying the routing protocol is encapsu-
lated in a new IP packet. We have shown only AH protocol which is used to integrity
protect the routing protocols. The same rules apply when the ESP will be used.
The RPsec is designed to support such diversity in the choice of the security
protocols. It does not mandate use of any specific security protocol (whereas IPsec
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uses AH and ESP only). This diversity is desired because the security mechanisms
vary for the routing protocols.
8.3 RPsec Overview
This section provides a high level description of the RPsec’s component databases and
how they will fit into the routing protocol security requirements. RPsec has three
component databases—RPAD, RSPD and CKT—that provide peer authentication
information, security protocol choices and key related parameters respectively, for the
security of the routing protocols. The RSPD contains the security protocol options
for the routing protocols. Each entry in the RPsec will point to an entry in the
CKT that provides the key related parameters to use with the security protocol. The
RPAD will contain the authentication data for the peer routers and also specifies an
appropriate KMP for negotiation/establishment of a SA with the peer.
The RPsec will be implemented in the routing devices as a support module (in
layer 3) for the key management of the routing protocols. In that, the KMPs will use
RPsec for establishing an SA. In absence of a KMP, the routing protocol will consult
the RPsec databases directly for the security. In this case, no negotiation would take
place. In either case, the actual security protocol (as discussed in existing security
mechanisms in Section 2.6) will be provided the master key and/or the derived key
using an appropriate KDF (if any), via some interface. These mechanisms will then
integrity protect the routing protocol packets using the keys as usual.
The RPsec also guides the processing behavior for the routing protocol traffic.
To be specific, the entries in the RPsec will allow the router to decide whether to
PROTECT, BYPASS or DISCARD that traffic.
The support offered by RPsec to the KMPs, the routing protocols and the security
mechanisms will depend upon the quality of the design and the implementation of
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the interfaces for each of them as discussed in Section 8.2.
The RPsec is designed such that it could be used with/without the KMPs. We
highly support the development of the KMPs that can be applied for key and SA
management of the routing protocols. However, manual methods are also supported
because not all deployments may require an automated key management solution.
8.4 Scope of Usage
The use of this framework is limited to the routing protocols and the associated se-
curity mechanisms only. It can also be used to provide the keys for existing security
mechanisms with each having its own interface to the RPsec. For example, it may
be used to populate the master key tuple used by TCP-AO to secure the BGP com-
munication [15] via some appropriate interface. The new routing protocols may be
designed to inherently use this framework for securing their messages.
8.4.1 Interface between a Routing Protocol and the RPsec
The details of how to interface the RPsec framework and a routing protocol is an
implementation issue. However, the implementors should consider following things
when designing such an interface.
The implementations of the routing protocols should be able to consult RPsec for
security requirements. In that, the implementation should provide the routing pro-
tocol traffic description, (optionally) an associated interface to search an appropriate
entry in the RSPD database.
The traffic should be dropped if the entry specifies DISCARD behavior for it.
Allow the traffic to pass through if the entry specifies BYPASS. This case is equiv-
alent to NULL authentication (as discussed in Section 2.7, OSPFv2 has a NULL
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authentication option), in which the traffic is simply allowed to pass through the
router.
If PROTECT is specified for the traffic, the implementation should find the asso-
ciated CKT entry (as discussed in previous section) for keys and related parameters.
The key and the security protocol is used to protect the traffic as described in that
CKT entry.
If there is no CKT entry look in the RPAD. If a KMP is specified do the negoti-
ation. Otherwise, drop the packet.
8.4.2 Interface between RPsec and a KMP
In absence of a CKT entry, the implementation should use the peer identity, security
protocol (specified in the RSPD) and (optionally) an associated interface to find an
appropriate KMP in the RPAD database. If no such entry is found in the RPAD, the
traffic should be discarded.
The function of the KMP is to authenticate the peer, negotiate/establish SA
between peers, rekey, and to derive and establish traffic keys for secure communication
between the routing protocol peers. The implementors should consider following
things when designing such an interface between the RPsec and a KMP.
To authenticate the peer, the interface should be designed such that a KMP could
fetch authentication data for the local and the peer router from the RPAD database.
The KMP should use the authentication data to validate both the participants before
starting the negotiation phase.
In negotiation phase, the KMP must be able to negotiate the most appropriate
security protocol available in the RSPD for that routing protocol peer. If one or more
entries are found, the KMP should be able to use the most recent entry based on its
lifetime information.
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Once the negotiation is successful, i.e., an appropriate CKT entry has been estab-
lished, the security protocol must consult the CKT for the keys and related param-
eters to secure the routing protocol messages as described in Section 3 of the CKT
specification [23].
The KMPs have mechanisms to track the lifetime of a traffic key and to rekey the
existing key before it expires. The references in Chapter 3 and the IKE specification
[25] explain how KMPs can perform all these functions in detail.
8.5 Security Policy and the RPsec
In this section, we would like to explain the relation between the term security policy
and the RPsec. Each organization has one or more network security policies. As per
the security policy, the administrators can specify multiple entries in RPsec databases
for each routing protocol running in their network. For example, an administrator
may wish to put multiple entries in the RSPD with overlapping lifetimes for key/SA
rollover. One may specify multiple security protocols in the RSPD in decreasing
order of preference. This may be required if they have some routers supporting old
security protocols only and some supporting both—the old and the new security
protocols. A KMP will negotiate an appropriate security protocol in each context
as described in previous section. In case of the manual method, the administrator
may put old security protocols as a first preference for the security. Therefore, when
the routing protocol consults the RPsec, it uses the first available entry for security.
Since each RPsec entry points to an entry in the CKT database, the administrator
will have to configure a CKT entry for each security protocol likely to be used by
the routing protocol. So the security policy defines the number of security options an
administrator may configure for a routing protocol.
Similarly, a router may have multiple identities in the network. The administrator
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will provide information for each potential identity that the routing peers may use to
communicate with each other in the RPAD database.
Therefore, the number of the entries in the databases, the choice of security proto-
cols, the authentication information, keys, etc., for the routing peers will be decided
by the security policy of the organization. However, an organization’s security policy
must specify a default DISCARD entry in the RSPD for all the routing protocols
that should not be bypassed/protected. No entries must exist in RPAD and CKT
databases for a routing protocol traffic that should be bypassed or discarded. All
the three databases must contain appropriate entries for each routing protocol traffic
that should be protected. In case of manual methods, only the RSPD and/or the
CKT will contain appropriate entries. When we mention the availability of a security
policy or just a security policy for a routing protocol traffic, we mean that there is
at least one entry (including the default entry) that specifies the processing behavior
for that routing protocol traffic.
8.6 A Formal Introduction to RPsec databases
In this section, we formally introduce the RPsec databases.
8.6.1 RSPD
The objective of the RSPD is to provide security options (choice of security pro-
tocol) for a routing protocol’s security. Each entry (a choice) specify the security
parameters required to establish a SA between the peers. An authorized device may
communicate with many routing protocol peers. To do so, it must agree on the se-
curity requirements of the routing protocol peer for successful communication. The
peers must agree on security protocols, transforms, mode of communication along
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with the key required to integrity protect messages exchanged between them. This
database aims to provide such information. The RSPD contains the traffic descriptors
for identifying each routing protocol traffic that needs to be protected, bypassed or
discard. The RSPD, thus, is a database to specify the traffic descriptors for the rout-
ing protocol traffic, security protocols, lifetime and related parameters for securing
the communication between the two devices or among a group in case of the mul-
ticast communication. This database provides partial information towards security
requirements of the routing protocols. The rest of the information is provided by the
CKT. Chapter 9 explains the RSPD database in detail.
8.6.2 CKT
The CKT, as discussed in Section 4.2, is an important database that provisions key
material and associated cryptographic algorithms to protect the routing protocol
messages. In RPsec, the CKT performs the role similar to the SAD in IPsec. It
stores the negotiated (or manually configured) SAs for the routing protocols. In that,
each RSPD entry points to an appropriate entry in the CKT. Each RSPD entry that
protects the routing protocol traffic, provides a (security) protocol id and a peer id
(traffic descriptor) that identify an entry in this database. The form of the protocol
id and the peer id is specified in [23]. The RSPD together with CKT ensure that the
key is provided to a security protocol that is used for securing the routing protocol.
8.6.3 RPAD
The RPAD’s objective is to provide authentication information and a KMP for the
routing peers. It provides authentication information necessary to assert a local
device’s identity and to validate the identity asserted by the peer devices. A KMP uses
the information in the RPAD and the RSPD for authentication and SA negotiation,
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respectively. Authentication is required to ensure that the devices participating in
the network infrastructure are legitimate. A legitimate device should present its
identity, identity of remote peer(s) or group it wishes to communicate with, and an
organization-wide acceptable credentials. If the device successfully passes the peer
device’s scrutiny, it is authenticated to communicate with the requested peer(s) or
a group in the network. The communication between the two devices must stop if
the KMP fails to authenticate the peers using the information available in the RPAD
database. A KMP negotiates SA only after the authentication is successful. Chapter 9
explains the RPAD database and its contents.
8.7 Using the RPsec
We identified the way RPsec fits in the security framework for routing protocols in
Chapter 7. Now let us understand how RPsec can be used with/without a KMP.
8.7.1 Using RPsec with a KMP
Figure 6 shows the similarity between the IPsec-IKE interaction and the RPsec-
KMP interaction. In that, a KMP uses the RPAD database for the authentication
parameters required for peer validation. Next, the RSPD provides the list of security
protocols for the negotiation/establishment of the desired SA. The negotiated SA
points to an appropriate entry stored in the CKT. The routing protocol packet is
then protected using the cryptographic protocol and the key specified in that CKT
entry. As discussed in the previous sections, the routing protocol checks for the entries
that match its packet description in the RSPD. If the database has no entry for it,
the packet must be discarded as per the default discard entry in the RSPD. Allow
the packet to pass through if an entry specifies the bypass behavior for it.
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Figure 6: IPsec and RPsec interacting with KMP
If a RSPD entry specifies to protect that traffic, the implementation must look
for a corresponding entry in the CKT. If no entry is found, the routing protocol
refers to the RPAD for a KMP invocation. If an entry is found it must specify
the use of a KMP. The KMP performs mutual authentication using credentials from
the RPAD and establishes a SA with the peer router using the security parameters
from the RSPD entry. In case the KMP fails to negotiate a SA, the packet must
be discarded. The packet must also be discarded if the RPAD does not contain any
authentication information for the destination of the packet (a peer router). Finally,
the negotiated SA points to an entry in the CKT database that is used to protect
the routing protocol communication. The security mechanism is provided with the
key and related parameters from this CKT entry via an interface. The work in [15]
specifies how an interface from CKT to security mechanisms for routing protocols can
be made. Figure 7 shows a flow chart that describes the process flow when a KMP is
used.
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Figure 7: Using RPsec with a KMP mechanism
8.7.2 Using RPsec with Manual Method
The RPsec also supports manual method. The routing protocol implementation con-
sults the RSPD for the security. There is no role of RPAD as SAs are not negotiated
in manual method. Instead, the choice of a security protocol is defined by the admin-
istrator as per the security policy of the organization. The routing protocol uses the
first available entry that matches its packet description. The routing protocol traffic
is discarded if no entry exists for it as per the default discard entry. The traffic is
allowed to pass through if a bypass entry exists for it. Finally, if a RSPD entry that
specifies the protect behavior for it exists, the routing protocol uses the keys from the
CKT entry pointed to by this RSPD entry. Thus, the packet is protected using the
key and the cryptographic protocol specified in the CKT entry. The keying material
to the security mechanisms is provided in the same way as discussed in the previous
section. It should be noted that, in case of the manual method, the information in the
RPsec databases should be consistent at the communicating peers. Figure 8 shows
a flow chart that describes the process flow when the manual method is used. For
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Figure 8: Using RPsec with manual method
key/SA change or rollover, some process in the router should be able to keep track
of the lifetime of the key/SA. This process should trigger the key change before the
current key/SA expires. Since, the security information will be consistent for a rout-
ing protocol in the network, all the routers will rollover/change the key/SA before
it expires. Thus, the change occurs simultaneously in all the routers in the network.
This is one of the major problem that is faced by the operators using present manual




In this chapter, we discuss in detail the information that is included in the RPsec
databases—RSPD and RPAD. These conceptual databases are designed to cooperate
with the CKT to provide an overall security framework for the routing protocols.
Appendix E specifies the SA parameters for the existing routing protocol security
mechanisms as discussed in the Section 2.6. This chapter updates and re-groups those
SA parameters for developing a common framework.
9.1 RPsec Databases
As with the CKT, the RSPD and the RPAD databases are designed to separate
protocol-specific aspects from both the manual and the automated key management
methods. The information in these databases describe the security services for the
routing protocols. The aim is to allow different implementation approaches to RPsec
while simplifying the specification of the security services and the way those ser-
vices can be deployed in the routing protocol environment. The implementations
should conform to the characteristics of the RPsec that is communicated by these
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databases. The information included in the RPsec does not specify a system configu-
ration, instead, it resides over the system configuration as the management of security
information for the KMPs and the routing protocols. The way the RPsec is deployed
will depend on an organization’s security policy as discussed in the previous chapter.
We use the following conventions for the default-values in each field of the RPsec
databases. Any RPsec database field may contain some valid data, ANY or OPAQUE.
Each field defines the form and type of the valid data. However, the use of ANY or
OPAQUE is as follows. ANY is used as a wildcard that matches any value in the
corresponding field of the packet. Use of OPAQUE means, the value corresponding
to that field does not exist or is not required for processing the packet. Such use is
well tested in IPsec [26] and we will use these values in our RPsec databases as well,
when appropriate.
9.1.1 RSPD-Routing Security Policy Database
The RSPD is an important database in the RPsec. It allows a security administrator
to specify the desired security level for the routing protocols.
The RSPD is consulted at all the times for all the traffic generated by/received for
the routing protocols. Routing protocol traffic should be discarded if a specific entry
or a global entry specifies DISCARD processing behavior for it. The traffic should
be allowed to BYPASS if an entry specifies so in the RSPD. The traffic is protected
if an entry defines the PROTECT behavior and contains all the security parameters
for it. The actual protection is provided by the security mechanisms as discussed in
the previous chapter.
The RSPD allows the security administrators to specify multiple entries for routing
protocol traffic in the order of most preferred entry first. An entry is selected based
on the longest match that fits the packet description. The traffic must match at least
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one of these entries for the RPsec to protect it.
There are at least two entries for a unicast traffic protected by the RPsec, one for
the outbound traffic to the peer and one for the inbound traffic from the peer. This is
done by swapping the source and the destination addresses and the ports in the RSPD
entry. But this cannot be done in case of a multicast communication as a multicast
address can never appear in the source address field of an IP packet. Later in this
chapter we will discuss the RPsec for multicast communications and explain how the
directionality is specified for a multicast traffic. The role of the RSPD database–
• Identification of the routing protocol traffic of interest.
• Specify the processing behavior for the identified routing protocol traffic.
• Specify one or more available security options for the routing protocol in user-
ordered preference.
• Allow existence of the multiple entries to promote regular key/SA rollover.
RSPD Contents
A RSPD entry contains traffic selectors, security parameters, lifetime, and one or
more associated interfaces. In case of partial entries, one or more fields may contain
“ANY” or “OPAQUE” value. The fields in the RSPD are as follows-
Traffic Selectors
A set of values used to define the routing protocol traffic that should be protected by
the RPsec. A set of traffic selectors may identify a single or multiple routing protocols
depending on the values of the parameters. Each parameter in the set may contain a
specific value, a range of values, ANY or OPAQUE. The traffic that exactly matches
or falls under the range specified by the traffic selectors is protected by the RPsec.
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The ANY value literally matches any value in the corresponding field for the traffic
that crosses the router. The OPAQUE is set to convey that, either the information
corresponding to those fields does not exist or is not applicable to the traffic in the
context. For example, the IPv4 and the IPv6 packet formats are different and to
reflect that the database may contain OPAQUE values wherever necessary. Also, if a
next layer protocol does not use the IANA port numbers then OPAQUE must be set
against the corresponding fields in the database. The following traffic selectors are
defined for identifying the traffic:
Source IP Address
This is an IP address assigned to the local router’s interface.
Destination IP Address
It refers to an IP address assigned to the peer router’s interface. The peer may
lie on the same network as the source router.
Next Layer Protocol (NLP)
The value in this field corresponds to the IPv4 packet’s “protocol” field or the
“next header” field found in an IPv6 packet. This field may contain an individual
protocol number or ANY. The NLP in an IPv6 packet is anything that comes
after the extension headers.
The values in the next two fields depend upon the protocol specified in the NLP
field. For example, if the protocol is TCP(6) or UDP(17), the next two fields will
contain the port numbers required to identify the connection. If the NLP is for
example, an OSPF protocol (89), then the source and destination port fields will
contain ANY or OPAQUE.
Source Port
If the NLP refers to a protocol that uses local port number(s) then this field
contains the supported port numbers or the range of port numbers corresponding
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to the NLP. The value OPAQUE specifies—this field is not required. The value
ANY means any IANA defined number is allowed in this field.
Destination Port
If the NLP refers to a protocol that uses specific remote port number(s) then
this field contains the supported port number or the range of port numbers cor-
responding to the NLP. The value OPAQUE specifies—this field is not required.
The value ANY means any IANA defined number is allowed in this field.
Both the source and the destination ports are defined as a range. The adminis-
trator must define the lower and the upper values for these fields. For example, a
range starting with 1025 (lower-value) to 5000 (upper-value). The administrators can
define a trivial range for specifying a unique port. For example, lower-value=1024
and upper-value=1024.
Processing Behavior
The RSPD allows an administrator to define the processing behavior for each routing
protocol traffic passing through the router. As discussed earlier, the value of this field
determines whether to protect, bypass or discard the routing protocol traffic.
Processing behavior
This field can contain any one of these values—PROTECT, BYPASS or DIS-
CARD. PROTECT specifies that the identified routing protocol traffic should
be protected. The router can further refer to RSPD, RPAD and CKT for secu-
rity parameters as discussed earlier. BYPASS allows the traffic to pass through
(no further lookups in RPAD/CKT). The last choice specifies that the identified
traffic is not allowed to pass through the router and must be dropped.
Security Parameters
The security parameters specify the security protocols for the routing protocol. It
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contains only those cryptographic protocols that are supported by the routing proto-
cols identified by the traffic selectors. Multiple RSPD entries may be specified for a
routing protocol in the order of preference.
Following security parameters are specified in the RSPD entry:
ProtocolID
It identifies a single security protocol that is supported by a routing protocol. If
a routing protocol supports multiple security protocols, the administrator may
configure a RSPD entry for each in the order of preference. A KMP solution
will negotiate the security protocol in this order. The list of present supported
security protocols is given in Section F.1, Appendix F.
Mode
This field identifies the mode of operation of the security protocol. For example,
AH and ESP support two modes of operations—transport mode and tunnel mode.
TransformType
It specifies which feature of the security protocol (corresponding to the Proto-
colID) to use, integrity(INTEG) or encryption(ENCR). It is unlikely to use the
ENCR type security for the routing protocols, however, this field will be used
to specify which feature of the security protocol to use for securing the routing
protocol. For example, ESP protocol’s INTEG feature may be used for protecting
the OSPFv3 routing protocol.
TransformID
A security protocol may have one or more transforms that it uses to integrity
protect or transform (encrypt and decrypt) the routing protocol messages. Sec-




The lifetime parameters define the time period for which the corresponding RSPD
entry is valid for use. Just like security parameters, multiple RSPD entries may
exist for a routing protocol with slightly overlapping time periods. Overlapping time
periods allow for the key/SA rollover without dropping the ongoing communication
between the routing protocols. Eventually, the old entry must expire for a new SA
to take over completely. The format of the lifetime parameters in the RSPD is the
same as specified in the CKT specification [23]. The negotiated SAs established will
have the same age (or less) as the age of this RSPD entry.
SendLifeTimeStart
It specifies the earliest time in coordinated universal time (UTC) at which this
entry should be considered for use when sending the traffic.
AcceptLifeTimeStart
It specifies the earliest date at which the traffic protected by the security protocol
specified in this entry should be processed by the communicating entities.
SendLifeTimeEnd
It specifies the latest time at which this entry should be stopped for use.
AcceptLifeTimeEnd
It specifies the latest time at which further processing of the traffic protected by
security protocols in this entry should stop.
Interfaces
One or more interfaces of the router can be specified on which to use the security
protocol dictated by this RSPD entry. The question of whether the interface field
is required to properly apply a security protocol is specified by the routing protocol
itself. For example, the security of OSPF protocol is interface based, i.e., all the
routers on the same network as the OSPF interface use same SA. It should be noted
73
that the SAs are usually tied to the interfaces. The combination of the key identifier
and the interface associated with the message uniquely identify the security protocol
and associated keys to use as specified in [7] and [33].
InterfaceID
This field identifies the physical or virtual interfaces of the router on which to
use the security protocol. The value in this field is set to “ALL” if the security
protocol is to be used on all the interfaces of this router. Also, the security type
for a routing protocol can be host based or interface based. In host based, the
security protocols can be specified per host. In interface based, all the peers that
connect to that interface share the same security protocol. The format of this
field conforms to the CKT specification [23].
9.1.2 RPAD-Routing Peer Authorization Database
The RPAD provides a link between the RSPD and a KMP. It provides the identities
of the peers or identity of a group of peers that will communicate with this router.
It specifies a KMP and authentication data to be used for the peer authentication.
The order of the RPAD entries is defined by the administrator. The entry contains
only those identities that a peer can assert to this router for identification.
In the next section we will see the contents of the RPAD entry. The RPAD helps
in performing following critical functions–
• Provides a link between the RSPD and a KMP solution.
• Identifies the peer or a group of peers that are authorized to communicate with
this router.
• Specifies the KMP protocol and method used to authenticate each peer.
• Provisions authorization-credentials for the routing peers.
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RPAD Contents
A RPAD entry contains the identity of a peer or a group of peers, specification of
a KMP, associated credentials, lifetime of the entry and the associated interfaces as
follows:
Identification Information
It contains the identity of each peer or a group of peers that may communicate with
this router. Each entry has a local identity that represents this router and a remote
identity of the peer router. There is no limitation on the number of identities that a
router can possess in the network.
LocalID
This field contains the identity of the local router that will be used to communi-
cate with the peer specified in the PeerID field. A router may possess multiple
identities in which case the administrator will have to put multiple RPAD entries
for each identity. This field can contain all the ID types that are supported by
the IKE protocol [25].
PeerID
This field contains the identification information of the peer router. This field may
contain only one value per entry. Since a peer may possess multiple identities, the
administrator will have to list all the identities of the peer router that the local
device is expected to communicate with. This field and LocalID field can contain
all the ID types that are supported by the IKE protocol [25]. The Section F.4 in
Appendix F lists the possible identities that may be supported by the RPsec.
Authentication Information
Authentication information indicates whether a KMP is used for authenticating the
peer router. If a KMP is used, it further specify the type of the KMP, the identity
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of the KMP protocol and the authentication method. Authentication information
consists of the following fields–
KMPType
It specifies the type of the KMP to use for peer authentication—UNICAST OR
MULTICAST.
KMPID
This field specifies the identity of the KMP (of type KMPType) to be used for
key and SA negotiation.
Auth-Type
This field indicate the type of authentication to be performed. Presently two
types of authentication are available—pre-shared secret and X.509 certificate.
The encoding of these types of authentication data is described in the Section F.5.
Credentials
It is a logical container that stores the authentication data and the related information
in the RPAD depending upon the value of Auth-Type field.
AuthData
If the Auth-Type is a pre-shared key, this field contains a shared-secret. If the
Auth-Type value is X.509 certificate, then this field contains the certificate pro-
vided by the administrator. The encoding of the AuthData depends on the IKE
supported encoding types defined in Section F.5.
CertificateAuthority (CA)
If the certificate authentication is used, this field may contain an indicator of the
trusted authorities, OCSP server or a policy server that is used to validate the
AuthData. The value in this field may be OPAQUE if a pre-shared secret is used.




The administrators may want to configure the lifetime for each entry in the RPAD
database. The lifetime of the RPAD entry may be the same as the lifetime of the
pre-shared key or the certificate that is used for authentication. The information can
be simply be stated in terms of hours, minutes, seconds, days or months.
Interfaces
This field is same as the InterfaceID in the RSPD. It is used to identify the interfaces
on which to use the KMP specified by the KMPID.
With all this information, the RPAD provides security parameters to protect
against the spoofing attack because a KMP consults the RPAD database for peer
validation. The KMP may re-authenticate the peer during rekey/renegotiation phase,
if desired. The administrator must provision all the peer information in the RPAD
for a secured communication.
9.1.3 Security association database for routing protocols
The CKT performs the role of the security association database in the RPsec frame-
work. As discussed in the previous chapters, the CKT is used to store SAs for the
routing protocols. If a KMP is used, the negotiated SA is put into the CKT. An
administrator can also manually configure the SA at each peer involved in the com-
munication. The CKT fits the requirements of a SAD for this framework because it
is developed exclusively for key management of routing protocols. The CKT entries
are effectively used for identifying the master key, list of peers that share this key,
the cryptographic algorithm, associated KDFs and the lifetime information. A CKT
entry is identified based on a (security) protocol identity and a peer identity provided
by the routing protocol. It also standardizes the way this information is represented
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in the key table. The information of the fields in the CKT is specified in [23].
9.2 Multicast RPsec
Multicast RSPD
In the unicast communications, two RSPD entries can be specified. For example, one
entry for the outbound traffic from “source address A:source port Ap” to a “destina-
tion address B:destination Port Bp”. The second entry for the inbound traffic from
“source address B:source port Bp” to “destination address A:destination port Ap”.
Thus, the directionality is represented by swapping the source-destination addresses
and ports (if applicable).
This way of representing the directionality is not possible in multicast commu-
nications as the destination address (a multicast address) can never appear in the
source address field of an IP packet. To represent the directionality for multicast
communications a new field “Direction” is added to the RSPD. This field may con-
tain following values—SENDER-ONLY, RECEIVER-ONLY or SYMMETRIC—as
suggested in [42]. Thus, the RSPD extended by adding the direction field becomes
the multicast RSPD (mRSPD). The mRSPD will support RSPD entries for both, the
unicast and the multicast communications. The fields which are not required for the
unicast communications will be set to OPAQUE.
Multicast RPAD
As discussed in the available GKMP standards (Section 3.2), each GM communicates
with the GCKS of the group it wishes to join. The knowledge of the GCKS is
important because it provides the group SA that will be used among the GMs for
a secure communication. Thus, each GM must know the identity of the GCKS as
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well as the identity of the group it wishes to join. The former can be specified in the
RPAD identity field. However, the latter introduces a new field—GroupID—in the
RPAD. This field stores the identity of the multicast group. The GM should specify
the identity of the multicast group it wishes to join. The GCKS then checks the
validity of the GM’s request and responds only if the request is validated. Thus, for
a multicast communication, following data fields are required:
• GCKSID: It does not require a separate field. This information is stored in the
peer-id field in the RPAD. Each multicast group may have its own GCKS. It is
also possible that a GCKS manages more than one multicast group.
• GroupID: This adds a new field to the RPAD. It represents the identity of
a multicast group that a GM wishes to join. The GroupID along with the
GCKSID will be used to authenticate the GCKS. This information will also show
a GM’s intent to join a particular multicast group controlled by the GCKS. We
will use the IANA assigned addresses to refer to the routing protocol multicast
groups. For example, 224.0.0.5 refers to the ALL OSPF ROUTERS.
This extended RPAD is called the multicast RPAD (mRPAD). The mRPAD will
support authentication data entries for both, the unicast and the multicast commu-
nications. The GroupID field which is not required for the unicast communication
will be set to OPAQUE.
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Chapter 10
Representation and Distribution of
RPsec Policies
This chapter explains the YANG modules for each RPsec database. Section 9.5 de-
scribes a possible way of configuring RPsec databases in the network in compliance
with the IETF’s policy-based network management (PBMN) and distributed man-
agement architecture as described in [14]. Finally, we present two examples for using
the RPsec in Section 10.6.
For management of the contents of the RPsec databases, we have organized and
defined the data fields of the RPsec databases in following four modules–
• RPsec common types module: We have grouped all the common and reusable
RPsec specific data elements and data types in this module for consistency.
It acts like a data type library for the other three modules. The other three
modules import RPsec common types module. The other standard modules that
these modules import are the YANG common types (RFC6020) and the IETF
internet types (RFC6991). The Yang model for it is described in Appendix A.
• RPAD module: It contains all the data elements described in Section 9.1.2.
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Section 10.2 represents the tree diagram of the RPAD YANG model. The
complete YANG data module for the RPAD is described in Appendix B.
• RSPD module: It contains all the data elements described in Section 9.1.1.
Section 10.3 represents the tree diagram of RSPD data model. The complete
YANG model for the RSPD is descibed in Appendix C.
• CKT module: It contains all the data elements described in RFC7210 [23].
Section 10.4 represents the tree diagram of CKT. The complete YANG model
for the CKT is described in Appendix D.
We have represented only the tree diagram in this chapter. For actual modules, please
refer to appendix corresponding to each module. The modules are self-explanatory
in that, each data type, node, leaf, leaf-lists contains a description for themselves.
However, the descriptions are the same as explained in Chapter 8.
The tree representation for RPsec common types module cannot be represented
because it does not contain any real node.
The tree diagrams for YANG modules are generated using the PYANG tool. This
tool is first used to compile the original YANG modules. Once the compilation
is successful, one can generate the tree representation of each module. We have
compiled and validated the above mentioned YANG modules for compliance with
YANG syntax and semantics, IETF standard representation and proper referencing
of imported modules. Then, we generated the XSD for each module. These XSDs are
used to generate equivalent XML documents for the RPsec databases. The sample
XML documents are shown with examples later in this chapter.
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10.1 Terminology for Yang Tree Diagrams
In the next section, we discuss the tree diagram for each module. A YANG tree
diagram represents the structural arrangement of the nodes in the YANG model. It
provides a concise representation of the YANG module. It also represents the logical
containers that contain actual nodes and leaf nodes. One can identify the data type
of each leaf node in the tree.
The following conventions are used for representing tree diagrams. Each node is
printed with following information–status, flags, name, opts, type and if-features.
• Status, where status is one of +, x or o. + is for current, x for deprecated and
o for obsolete.
• Flags, where flag is one of rw, ro, -x, -n. rw for the configuration data, ro for
the non-configuration data,-x for the RPCs and -n for the notifications.
• Name is name of the node. Name between () brackets means that the node is a
choice node. Name between “:[name]” is a case node. If the node is augmented
into the tree from another module, its name is printed as prefix-of-imported-
module:name.
• Opts means options. ? for an optional leaf or choice. ! for a presence container,
* for a leaf-list or list and [Keys] for a list’s keys. List keys are used to uniquely
identify list items.
• Type, where type is the name of the type for leafs and leaf-lists.
• if-features, where if-features is the list of features this node depends on, printed
within curly brackets and a question mark “...?”.
We have numbered each line in the tree diagram for the ease of referencing and
explanation.
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10.2 YANG Model for RPAD




3. +--rw rpad-entry* [local-id]
4. +--rw local-id rpsectype:device-id
5. +--rw credential
6. | +--rw encoding rpad:cert-encoding
7. | +--rw authdata rpad:cert-data
8. | +--rw CA? rpad:cert-authority
9. +--rw auth-type rpad:authtype
10. +--rw rpad-peers* [peer-id]
11. | +--rw peer-id rpsectype:device-id
12. | +--rw group-id? union {mrpad}?
13. | +--rw credential
14. | | +--rw encoding rpad:cert-encoding
15. | | +--rw authdata rpad:cert-data
16. | | +--rw CA? rpad:cert-authority
17. | +--rw key-management
18. | +--rw KMPtype KMP-type
19. | +--rw KMPID yang:yang-identifier
20. +--rw interface rpsectype:interface-id
21. +--rw sendlifetimestart yang:date-and-time
22. +--rw acceptlifetimestart yang:date-and-time
23. +--rw sendlifetimeend yang:date-and-time
24. +--rw acceptlifetimeend yang:date-and-time
The line 1 represents the original module name. Lines 2, 5, 13 and 17 represent
logical containers. The logical containers are used for logically grouping the data
items. Line 2 shows a logical container that contains all the RPAD entries. Lines 5
and 13 logically group the credential information. Line 17 groups key-management
information. Line 3 represents a list of RPAD entries. Line 10 represents a list of
peers. All other lines are leaf nodes.
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10.3 YANG Model for RSPD
This section explains the logical structuring of the contents of RSPD database.
1. module: rspd
2. +--rw rpsec-rspd
3. +--rw rpsec-entry* [src-ip-address dest-ip-address NLP]
4. +--rw src-ip-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
5. +--rw dest-ip-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
6. +--rw src-ipv6-add? inet:ipv6-address-no-zone {ipv6}?
7. +--rw dest-ipv6-add? inet:ipv6-address-no-zone {ipv6}?
8. +--rw source-port
9. | +--rw lower-port union
10. | +--rw upper-port union
11. +--rw destination-port
12. | +--rw lower-port union
13. | +--rw upper-port union
14. +--rw next-layer-protocol uint16
15. +--rw processing-behavior enumeration
16. +--rw interface rpsectype:interface-id
17. +--rw direction? rpsectype:direction {mrspd}?
18. +--rw security-protocol* [protocol-id]
19. | +--rw protocol-id yang:yang-identifier
20. | +--rw mode? union
21. | +--rw transform-type enumeration
22. | +--rw transform-id yang:yang-identifier
23. +--rw sendlifetimestart yang:date-and-time
24. +--rw acceptlifetimestart yang:date-and-time
25. +--rw sendlifetimeend yang:date-and-time
26. +--rw acceptlifetimeend yang:date-and-time
Please note that the NLP is short for the next-layer-protocol (line 14). Line 1
represents the RSPD module. Line 2 represents a logical RSPD entry container. Line
3 is a list of RSPD entries and line 18 represents a list of the security protocols. Lines
6, 7, 17 and 20 are optional nodes. Lines 8 and 11 logically group the source and
destination ports information. All other lines represent leaf nodes.
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10.4 YANG Model for CKT
This section explains the logical arrangement of the contents of the CKT database.
1. module: ckt
2. +--rw rpsec-ckt
3. +--rw ckt-entry* [Protocol]
4. +--rw adminkeyname? yang:yang-identifier
5. +--rw localkeyname yang:yang-identifier
6. +--rw peerkeyname yang:hex-string
7. +--rw peers* [peer-id]
8. | +--rw peer-id inet:ip-address-no-zone
9. +--rw Protocol yang:yang-identifier
10. +--rw mode? string
11. +--rw protocol-specific-info? string
12. +--rw interface rpsectype:interface-id
13. +--rw KDF? union
14. +--rw ALGID yang:yang-identifier
15. +--rw Key yang:hex-string
16. +--rw direction rpsectype:direction
17. +--rw sendlifetimestart yang:date-and-time
18. +--rw acceptlifetimestart yang:date-and-time
19. +--rw sendlifetimeend yang:date-and-time
20. +--rw acceptlifetimeend yang:date-and-time
Line 1 is the name of the CKT module. Line 2 represents a logical container for
routing protocol SAs. Line 3 represents a list of CKT entries (SAs). Line 7 represents
a list of peers. It contains peer-id, protocol (security protocol) to use, interface on
which it lies with respect to the local router, master key to be used with the security
protocol and, the lines 4,11 and 13 represent optional nodes. The rest all are the leaf
nodes.
10.5 Distribution of Security Policy
This section explains a policy management architecture for distribution of RPsec
contents. This architecture follows the IETF’s standard for policy based networking
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defined in [43].
The two main architectural elements for policy control are a PEP (Policy Enfor-
ment Point), preferably a router, and a PDP (Policy Decision Point) which is likely
to be a remote policy server (PS) [43]. The PEP is a RPsec policy aware network
node and the PDP is a remote policy server that uses external repository or other
servers for fetching the policy information for the PEP. The PDP serves the requests
from the PEP and have the authority to force push/update the policies to it. Fig-
ure 9 shows the architectural elements for the RPsec policy distribution. The router
and the policy server are NETCONF aware network nodes, i.e., the PS acts as a
NETCONF server while the router is a NETCONF client.
Figure 9: Policy distribution architecture for RPsec
The PEP and the PDP interact in the following manner- Since the router (a
PEP) is RPsec aware, the router will send policy request(s) to policy server (PS),
a PDP. By RPsec aware we mean that the device implements RPsec framework as
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explained in previous chapters. The requests from the router may include the identity
information, the interface addresses and all the routing protocols that are configured
to run on it. This information will be used by the PDP to find appropriate RPsec
policies for each routing protocol mentioned in the request message. PS will only
reply with the policies for the routing protocols running on the router. The PS may
serve individual requests received from each router in a unicast communication. For
group communications, the PS should be able to push the shared policies to all the
member routers of that group. The decision of when to push the group policies is
an implementation detail. For example, such a push will be initiated when one of
the router in the group requested for the group security policies. This will enable
the PDP to look for the list of group members from some external repository (like
LDAP) and push the policies to each identified member. Another way could be to
wait for the requests from each group member. Thus, each member of the group is
provided with the shared policy on explicit requests only.
For a distributed policy management, this architecture can be enhanced to a dis-
tributed architecture by leveraging the work done in distributed policy-based network
management with NETCONF [14]. In that, each node may act as both, the PEP
and the PDP. The PEP module in router will receive notifications/configuration in-
formation for itself and the other routers it manages, from a PDP higher up in the
heirarchy. The local PDP (LPDP) module will act as a distribution point for the
routers lower in the heirarchy.
Figure 10 shows a distributed policy distribution architecture for RPsec policies.
It depicts a distributed architecture where an intermediary node is both a PEP and
a PDP. The PEP module of the router receives the policies for itself and the nodes
it manages from the policy manager. The LPDP on the other hand deals with the
policy requests from the managed routers. The PEP and the LPDP modules may be
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Figure 10: Distributed policy distribution architecture for RPsec
implemented following the guidelines in [14].
These architectures must be implemented following the IETF guidelines for build-
ing network management applications using NETCONF and YANG [37].
10.6 Examples
Following conventions are used for the examples below:
• Administrators should use appropriate KMPs (unicast or multicast) when avail-
able. For now, we assume that some KMP exists for each routing protocol
mentioned in the examples.
• We have used security protocols, transforms, certificate encodings from Ap-
pendix F.
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• In case of a unicast communication, we have shown only one-entry, i.e., from a
sender to a receiver. For an incoming traffic, same entry exists but the source
address is swapped with destination address and source ports are swapped with
destination ports. For that reason, we have set the direction to “SYMMET-
RIC”.
• For multicast communications, the GCKS (corresponding to the GCKS-ID in
RPAD) provides key/SA information to the router. It is because SAs cannot
be negotiated for the multicast communications.
• For outgoing multicast traffic (from a source to a multicast address), the direc-
tion is set to “SENDER-ONLY”. For incoming multicast traffic the direction is
set to “RECEIVER-ONLY”. In absence of a peer information, the administra-
tors may define a single entry for all the incoming traffic to a multicast address.
It can be done by setting the source address to “ANY”, the destination address
to the multicast address of the routing protocol and by setting the direction to
“RECEIVER-ONLY”.
• We refer to a multicast group by its multicast address. For example, in case
of the OSPFv2, ALL OSPF ROUTERS and ALL DESIGNATED ROUTERS
groups are identified by 224.0.0.5 and 224.0.0.6, respectively.
• We set a field’s value to “OPAQUE” if it is not required.
• Lastly, each example shows RPsec databases contents from a single router’s
perspective. Similar configurations would be required on its neighbors as well.
We have used the PYANG tool for generating the XSD corresponding to each YANG
module presented in this work. The XML documents are generated using these XSDs.
In Section 2.7, we learned that the OSPFv2 has null authentication, simple password
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authentication and cryptographic authentication options for security. However, the
operators can configure only one option per OSPF interface. Usually, MD5 or HMAC
is used.
For the null authentication, the RSPD entry will specify bypass behavior for the
traffic. This way the packets will be allowed to pass through. Use of this option is
not recommended. The simple password mechanism is not suggested for use, how-
ever, CKT’s “key” field contains the password that the OSPF can use directly as a
simple password. Lastly, the cryptographic mechanisms. The RSPD contains a list
of desired security protocols for the OSPF. The KMPs should be able to use this list
for negotiation/establishment of a SA. The KMPs use the keys, lifetime and other
information from the CKT for a key change or a SA renegotiation.
Below we illustrate two examples that specify the RPsec entries for securing the
OSPFv2 traffic:
• OSPFv2 is unicast on a Non Broadcast Multiaccess (NBMA) network such as
frame-relay. In this case, the operators manually configure the neighbors for
the OSPF routers.
• OSPFv2 is multicast on the broadcast networks such as Ethernet. In this case,
the OSPF neighbors listen on two multicast addresses, 224.0.0.5 and 224.0.0.6.
The first address is used to send updates to ALL OSPF ROUTERS and the
second is used to send updates to ALL DESIGNATED ROUTERS.
All other routing protocol traffic should be discarded by default.
10.6.1 Example 1: OSPF on NBMA
In this case, the RPsec contains entries for the unicast OSPFv2 traffic.
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Scenario For a OSPFv2 router 192.168.0.1, we have two neighbors—192.168.0.2
and 192.168.0.3—on the NBMA network. These neighbors lie on the interface “serial-
0/1”. The organization has decided the following security policy for the OSPFv2–
The Authentication type should be pre-shared secret. There are two choices for the
security protocol–
• OSPFv2 HMAC with RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 384
• OSPFv2 KEYED MD5 with RP AUTH KEYED MD5
The HMAC is preferred because it is the first entry in the list (remember that the
list of security protocol is a user-ordered list). Also, the HMAC stronger than the
MD5. A unicast KMP negotiates for these security protocols. We assume that the
KMP successfully established an SA for using the OSPFv2 HMAC security protocol.
Example RPAD Entry For OSPF on NBMA Table 3 shows the simplified




















































































Example RSPD Entry For OSPF on NBMA Table 4 shows the simplified
view of an entry in RSPD. Following it is an equivalent XML representation of the
RSPD entry.














protocol-id OSPFv2 HMAC OSPFv2 HMAC
mode OPAQUE OPAQUE
transform-type INTEG INTEG
transform-id RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 384 RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 384




















































<!--Destination address is set to 192.168.0.3,
rest of the fields are same as above entry-->
</p:rpsec-entry>
</p:rpsec-rspd>
Example CKT Entry For OSPF on NBMA Table 5 shows the CKT entry
for the OSPFv2 traffic on a NBMA netowrk. Followed by it is an equivalent XML
representation of CKT entry.
CKT Field First Entry Second Entry






































































10.6.2 Example 2: OSPF on broadcast networks
In this example, we illustrate the RPsec entries for the OSPFv2 on a broadcast
network such as Ethernet.
Scenario We have an OSPFv2 router 172.16.0.1, which is connected to two neigh-
bors 172.16.0.2 and 172.16.0.3, via ethernet-0/1. The OSPFv2 on the broadcast net-
works uses two multicast addresses, 224.0.0.5 (ALL OSPF ROUTERS) and 224.0.0.6
(ALL DESIGNATED ROUTERS). Since two multicast addresses are used, we have
two appropriate RSPD entries for the outgoing traffic. For incoming traffic, we have
two RSPD policies that allow traffic to these multicast addresses from ANY source.
The CKT has one entry for outgoing/incoming traffic to these mutlicast addresses.
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The organization has decided to use following security policy in this case. The au-
thentication type to use is pre-shared-secret (raw rsa key). The OSPFv2 HMAC and
associated transform RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 224, is the choice of the security pro-
tocol. A GCKS will provide the group keys for the multicast communication using a
suitable GKMP.
Example RPAD Entry For OSPF on Broadcast Networks Table 6 shows



















































































Example RSPD Entry For OSPF Broadcast Network Table 7 and Ta-
ble 8 show the simplified view of RSPD entries. Following it is an equivalent XML
representation.















protocol-id OSPFv2 HMAC OSPFv2 HMAC
mode OPAQUE OPAQUE
transform-type INTEG INTEG






Table 7: Example RSPD entries for outgoing OSPFv2 traffic on the broadcast network















protocol-id OSPFv2 HMAC OSPFv2 HMAC
mode OPAQUE OPAQUE
transform-type INTEG INTEG





































































































































Example CKT Entry For OSPF on Broadcast Networks Table 9 shows





















































Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the work done to accomplish the goal stated in Chapter 7.
As per guidelines in [28], RPsec addresses the following threats to routing protocols-
Outsider: By using the information in RPAD the validity of a routing peer can be
established, thus protecting against the spoofing and the man-in-the-middle attacks.
In case if a router has been compromised, the RPAD and the RSPD databases of
the other routers can be updated to exclude the compromised router from the valid
participants list.
Unauthorized Key Holder: To prevent an attacker from gaining access to the traf-
fic key that is used to integrity protect the exchanged messages, the administrators
should specify multiple entries in the RPsec databases such that no one key/SA is used
for long. Considering that a fairly strong security protocol is being used, regularly
changing/rolling-over the keys/SAs will reduce the vulnerability due to cryptanalysis
of the routing protocol packets.
Terminated Employee: A terminated employee is an example of unauthorized key
holder. Once an employee leaves the organization, the security keys must be changed
in order to minimize the potential attack source.
Following summarizes the role of RPsec:
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• It provisions authentication information for the routing protocol peers.
• It provides support for KMPs for dynamic negotiation, establishment and rekey/rollover
of SAs for the routing protocols when available.
• Administrators can specify multiple security mechanisms in the RSPD for the
routing protocol.
• It overcomes the problems faced by the operators using the present manual
methods of security. One of the major problem that it overcomes is that it
supports regular key changes for the routing protocols.
• Finally, we provide a way to represent the above information such that it can
be easily modified, configured and distributed in the network.
We explained the way RPsec fits into the routing protocol environment, and the ways
to use it with manual and automated key management protocols in Chapter 8. We
then defined the Yang modules for RPsec. The RPsec consist of authorization in-
formation in RPAD, security policies for negotiation in RSPD and key parameters
associated with the each RSPD entry in CKT. These databases can be configured
using the robust NETCONF protocol. Finally, we provided an architecture for the
distribution of the management information in the RPsec that can be implemented
using the NETCONF. The suggested architecture can be implemented following the
well established IETF guidelines in [43] and [37]. Such an implementation will allow
the operators to manage the key/SA for all the routing protocols in a single man-
agement interface. This will benefit an organization economically when it does not
want to engage its personnel in laboriously changing keys/SA on all the routers in
the network. This will ease the job of the network operators and they will be mo-
tivated to regularly revise the security policy of the routing protocols. Whereas in
manual methods, the laborious task of changing keys/SA for routing protocols held
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them from doing regular revision of the security policy of the routing protocols. This
leads to a secure routing infrastructure, which in turn will insure safe routing on the
Internet.
11.1 Future Work
The next step in providing a robust security for routing protocols is the development
of KMP solutions using the RPsec framework. Other area that needs to be explored
is integration of this framework with existing routing protocols for replacement of
manual methods. Another interesting field that needs to be explored is the use of
authentication information in the RPAD database directly by the routing protocol.

































"This type contains variable length data.
Other types that use it should define the constrains on the






"interface-id refers to one of the following:
-configured interface is the one for which the configuration is
available on the device but interface itself is not enabled.








"It specifies the default field values for each selector in the
RPsec component databases.
-OPAQUE is used when ever a value is not available for the
corresponding field.
-ANY is used as ’*’ (a wild card) that matches any value in the









"The direction indicates should the corresponding entry be used
for inbound traffic, outbound traffic or both.
-SENDER-ONLY when only outbound traffic is protected by the
corresponding policy.
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-RECEIVER-ONLY when only incoming traffic is expected to be
protected by the corresponding policy.
-SYMMETRIC when the same policy should be used for protecting
the inbound and outbound traffic.
This field is important for specifying direction for routing




















"As per RFC4301, a host may have one of the following identity
that should be used by an AKM for selecting an entry and










"The earliest time at which the corresponding policy is valid
to be sent for negotiation or use. The policy is valid for
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negotiation by an AKM at this time if corresponding entry
lies in RSPD and policy is ready to be considered for use if






"The earliest time at which the corresponding policy is valid
for use when processing the routing protocol traffic of
interest. In case of RSPD entry this time specifies to an AKM
to consider this entry for negotiation. In case of CKT entry,
it specifies the keys and associated security protocols that






"The latest time at which the corresponding policy is valid
for use. If this field expries, the entry should not be used
anymore for processing the traffic. In case of RSPD, an AKM
should not use the entry for negotiation beyond this time.







"The latest time at which the corresponding policy is valid
for use. If this field expries, the entry should not be used
anymore for processing the traffic.
In case of RSPD, an AKM must stop negotiation for the
corresponding entry beyond this time.


























"This is the RPsec’s Routing Peer











"This feature means the device supports the multicast RPAD









"This field indicate the type of authentication to be
performed. Presently two types of authentication are
available---pre-shared secret and X.509 certificate.






















"It indicates the type of certificate
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or certificate-related information contained in
the certificate data field.
Only five types of certificate types are




-Raw RSA Key (raw_rsa_key) used only when
auth-type is PRE-SHARED-SECRET.
-Hash and URL of x.509 certificate
(hash_url_x.509_cert)
-Hash and URL of x.509 bundle
(hash_url_x.509_bundle)
Except Raw RSA Key, all other types are used






"It is the actual encoding of
the certification data the type of which is






"Same as in RFC5996.
The certificate authority field contains an
indicator of the trusted authorities for the
certificate type mentioned by field
cert-encoding.
Certification Authority (CA) values is a
concatenated list of SHA-1 hashes of the
public keys of trusted CAs. It is specified










type of key management protocol:
-UNICAST means unicast KMPs like IKE
































"It specify the type of credentials to be used.
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It should be consistent with the auth-type field:
-When authtype is PRE-SHARED-SECRET, the certificate
contains encoding=raw_rsa_key, data=pre-shared-secret
and CA is set to OPAQUE.
-When authtype is CERTIFICATE, the certificate contains
encoding=other than raw_rsa_key, data=actual certificate










"An rpad-entry can be fetched

















"For each RPAD entry it indicates the













"In case of unicast
communication it specify the peer
identity.
List of peers and associated credentials
corresponding to local-device’s id.
The credentials of local device and all peers in this
list must macth the auth-type described for this RPAD
entry. In case mrpad feature is used,the peer id refers
to a GCKS identity that represents the multicast group






































"Interface on which to use the specified KMP.






































































"Contains all rspd entries.";
list rpsec-entry {




A process will use following keys to












































"Net layer protocol field that matches the






















"Specify the directionality for multicast communications,






"User ordered choice of security protocol for
the traffic matching the traffic selector. It allows
specifying multiple security protocols for matching
traffic selectors. It provides agility to the choice of





























-INTEG for intergrity type
-ENCR for encryption type






"The transform id of type transform-type as supported by
security protocol id. It is a user ordered list of
transform ids.
This order is followed when negotiating the most
appropriate transforms between peers. The peers
must choose one transform from the list.











































"List of ckt entries.
A CKT entry can be fetched using

























"IPv4 or IPv6 address";
}
description










































"The value in this field will be the negotiated














"As opposed to in/out/both/disabled,this
field will contain values as:
-out equivalent to SENDER-ONLY.
-in equivalent to RECEIVER-ONLY.









SA Requirements of Routing
Protocols
This supplementary chapter outlines the SA requirements for security mechanisms of
routing protocols as discussed in Section 2.6. The SA requirement for each solution
is taken from its respective IETF standard document. The text in this chapter is
explained in breif to acquaint the reader with existing SA parameters and is mostly
included “as it is” to enhance understanding.
E.1 OSPFv2
E.1.1 Authentication Trailer [33]
AuthType– The value in this field shows the type of cryptographic authentication for
the routing protocol.
Key ID–This field identifies the algorithm (which is MD5) and secret key used to
create the message digest appended to the OSPF packet. Key Identifiers are unique
per-interface (or equivalently, per-subnet). The length of authentication data gen-
erated is specified by MD5 algorithm. An interface may have multiple keys active
at any one time for smooth transition from one key to another. Each key has a set
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lifetime. The lifetime is expressed as–
KeyStartAccept–The time that the router will start accepting packets that have been
created with the given key.
KeyStartGenerate–The time that the router will start using the key for packet gen-
eration.
KeyStopGenerate–The time that the router will stop using the key for packet gener-
ation.
KeyStopAccept–The time that the router will stop accepting packets that have been
created with the given key.
Cryptographic sequence number–An unsigned 32-bit non-decreasing sequence num-




In order to implement this specification, the following IPsec capabilities are required–
Mode–IPsec in transport mode must be supported.
SPDs–The implementation must support multiple SPDs with an SPD selection func-
tion that provides an ability to choose a specific SPD based on interface.
Selectors–The implementation must be able to use source address, destination ad-
dress, protocol, and direction as selectors in the SPD.
Interface ID–The implementation must be able to tag the inbound packets with the
ID of the interface (physical or virtual) via which it arrived.
Manual key support–Manually configured keys must be able to secure the specified
traffic.
Encryption and authentication algorithms–The AH and ESP security protocols are
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supported that are set manually.
Dynamic IPsec rule configuration–The routing module should be able to configure,
modify, and delete IPsec rules on the fly. This is needed mainly for securing virtual
links.
Encapsulation of ESP packet–IP encapsulation of ESP packets must be supported.
Different SAs for different Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCPs)– Multiple
SAs between same sender and receiver allows the implementation to associate differ-
ent classes of traffic with the same selector values in support of Quality of Service
(QoS).
E.2.2 Authentication Trailer [12]
An OSPFv3 Security Association (SA) contains a set of parameters shared between
any two legitimate OSPFv3 speakers. Parameters associated with an OSPFv3 AT
SA are as follows–
AuthType–It shows the choice of cryptographic authentication for OSPFv3.
SA ID–It is used to uniquely identify an OSPFv3 SA, as manually configured by the
network operator. The receiver determines the SA for incoming packet by looking at
this field value. Using SA IDs makes changing keys while maintaining protocol op-
eration convenient. Each SA ID specifies two independent parts, the authentication
algorithm and the authentication Key, as explained below. Each SA ID can indicate
a key with a different authentication algorithm. This allows the introduction of new
authentication mechanisms without disrupting ongoing communication.
Authentication Algorithm–This signifies the authentication algorithm to be used with
this OSPFv3 SA.
KeyStartAccept–The time that this OSPFv3 router will accept packets that have
been created with this OSPFv3 SA.
134
KeyStartGenerate–The time that this OSPFv3 router will begin using this OSPFv3
SA for OSPFv3 packet generation.
KeyStopGenerate–The time that this OSPFv3 router will stop using this OSPFv3
SA for OSPFv3 packet generation.
KeyStopAccept–The time that this OSPFv3 router will stop accepting packets gen-
erated with this OSPFv3 SA.
Authentication Key–This value denotes the Cryptographic Authentication Key asso-
ciated with this OSPFv3 SA. The length of this key is variable and depends upon the
authentication algorithm specified by the OSPFv3 SA.
E.3 PIM-SM
In order to implement this specification, the following IPsec capabilities are re-
quired [6]–
Mode–IPsec in transport mode must be supported.
SPDs–The implementation must support multiple SPDs with an SPD selection func-
tion that provides an ability to choose a specific SPD based on interface.
Selectors–The implementation must be able to use source address, destination ad-
dress, protocol, and direction as selectors in the SPD.
Interface ID–The implementation must be able to tag the inbound packets with the
ID of the interface (physical or virtual) on which they arrived.
Manual key support–It must be possible to use manually configured keys to secure
the specified traffic.
Encryption and authentication algorithms–The AH and ESP security protocols used
with the IPsec. It is set using manual methods. Implementations must support ESP-
NULL, and if providing confidentiality, must support the ESP transforms providing
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confidentiality required by RFC4835. Encapsulation of ESP packets–IP encapsulation
of ESP packets must be supported.
If the automatic keying features of this specification are implemented, the follow-
ing additional IPsec capabilities are required–
GSPD–The implementation must support the Group Security Policy Database that
is described in [42].
Multiple Group Security Policy Databases–The implementation must support mul-
tiple GSPDs with a GSPD selection function that provides an ability to choose a
specific GSPD based on interface.
Selectors–The implementation must be able to use source address, destination ad-
dress, protocol and direction as selectors in the GSPD.
E.4 BGP
E.4.1 TCP-MD5 [33]
Key–This is the shared secret used as an input to the MD5 calculation of the BGP
packet.
MD5 Hashing algorithm–This specification supports the MD5 algorithm for calculat-
ing the message digest.
TCP-AO [39]
MKT
A Master Key Tuple (MKT) describes TCP-AO properties to be associated with one
or more connections. It is composed of the following–
TCP connection identifier–A TCP socket pair, i.e., a local IP address, a remote
IP address, a TCP local port, and a TCP remote port. Values can be partially
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specified using ranges (e.g., 2-30), masks (e.g., 0xF0), wildcards (e.g., ”*”), or any
other suitable indication.
TCP option flag–This flag indicates whether TCP options other than TCP-AO are
included in the MAC calculation.
IDs–The values used in the KeyID or RNextKeyID of TCP-AO. These IDs are used
to differentiate MKTs in concurrent use (KeyID), as well as to indicate when MKTs
are ready for use in the opposite direction (RNextKeyID). Each MKT has two IDs—a
SendID and a RecvID.
The SendID is inserted as the KeyID of the TCP-AO option of outgoing segments,
and the RecvID is matched against the TCP-AO KeyID of incoming segments.
Master key–It is used for generating traffic keys, this may be derived from a separate
shared key by an external protocol over a separate channel.
KDF–Indicates the key derivation function and its parameters, as used to generate
traffic keys from master keys.
MAC algorithm–Indicates the MAC algorithm and its parameters as used for this
connection.
This document does not address how MKTs are created by users or processes. It
assumes that the MKTs can be managed by a separate application protocol or man-
ually.
KDF Alg–Specify the KDFs to be used for deriving TCP-AO’s traffic keys [29]. It is
set manually for the BGP peers.
Context–A binary string containing information related to the specific connection for
this derived keying material [39]. Output Length–The length, in bits, of the key that
the KDF will produce. This is specified by the KDF in use. MAC Algorithms–Each
MAC alg defined for TCP-AO has three fixed elements as part of its definition–




Following are the SA requirements for keyed-MD5 type security for RIPv2 [7]–
AuthType–Should be set to Keyed Message Digest.
Key ID–As with all security methods using MD5 with keys identified by this key
identifier. Each key will have its own key identifier, which is stored locally. The com-
bination of the key identifier and the interface associated with the message uniquely
identifies the Authentication Algorithm and RIP-2 Authentication Key in use.
HMAC for RIPv2
The minimum data items in a RIPv2 Security Association are as follows [5]–
Key-ID–The key identifier is used to identify the RIPv2 Security Association in use
for this packet.
The receiver uses the combination of the interface the packet was received upon
and the Key-id value to uniquely identify the appropriate Security Association.
The sender selects which RIPv2 Security Association to use based on the out-
bound interface for this RIPv2 packet and then places the correct Key-ID value into
that packet.
Auth-Alg–This specifies the cryptographic algorithm and algorithm mode used with
the RIPv2 Security Association.
Auth-Key–This is the value of the cryptographic authentication key used with the
associated Authentication Algorithm.
Sequence Number–This is an unsigned 32-bit number. For a given Key-ID value and
sender, this number must NOT decrease. The initial value used in the sequence num-
ber is arbitrary.
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Start Time–This is a local representation of the day and time that this Security As-
sociation first becomes valid.
Stop Time–This is a local representation of the day and time that this Security Asso-
ciation becomes invalid (i.e., when it expires). It is permitted, but not recommended,




F.1 Present Routing Protocol Integrity Algorithms
Table 10 shows the standard integrity algorithms for routing protocols. We assume
RP Integrity Algorithm RFC
OSPFv2 Keyed-MD5 RFC 2328
OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512 RFC 5709
OSPFv3 IPsec RFC 4552
OSPFv3 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512 RFC 7166
BGP Keyed-MD5 RFC 2385
BGP HMAC-SHA-1-96, AES-128-CMAC-96 RFC 5926
RIPv2 KEYED-MD5, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 RFC 4822
Table 10: Routing protocol integrity algorithms
that routing protocols security protocols can be represented as shown in Table 11.
The name of routing protocols are prefixed to their associated security algorithms. It
is considered that IETF will come up with similar representations that can distinguish
security protocols for routing protocols. These security protocols uses the integrity
transforms as listed in the next section.
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RP Security Protocol RFC
OSPFv2 OSPFV2 KEYED MD5 RFC 2328
OSPFv2 OSPFV2 HMAC SHA RFC 5709
OSPFv3 OSPFV3 IPSEC RFC 4552
OSPFv3 OSPFV3 HMAC SHA RFC 7166
PIM PIM IPSEC RFC 5796
BGP BGP KEYED MD5 RFC 2385
BGP BGP TCP AO RFC 5926
RIPv2 RIPV2 KEYED MD5, RIPV2 HMAC SHA RFC 4822
Table 11: Routing protocol security protocols
F.2 Routing Protocol Integrity Transforms
Table 12 below shows possible representation of the list of integrity transforms that
may be used in RPsec. These transforms are listed in Table 10.
Routing Protocol Integrity transforms
RP AUTH HMAC SHA1
RP AUTH HMAC SHA1 96
RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 224
RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 256
RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 384
RP AUTH HMAC SHA2 512
RP AUTH KEYED MD5
RP AUTH MET KEYED SHA1
RP AUTH AES 128 CMAC 96
RP AUTH AH
RP AUTH ESP
Table 12: Routing protocol integrity transforms
The list is compiled from draft-tran-karp-mrmp
It is considered that IETF will come up with similar representations that can
distinguish security protocols for routing protocols.
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F.3 Routing Protocol KDFs
The table below shows the possible KDF algorithms for routing protocols that may
be supported by RPsec.
Routing Protocol KDFs
KDF HMAC SHA1
KDF AES 128 CMAC 96
Table 13: Routing protocol KDFs
The list is compiled from 5926
F.4 IKE Supported Identity
List of all the identities that are supported by IKE may also be supported in RPsec’s
RPAD database. These IDs must be supported by all the routing protocol KMPs:
IKE supported IDs
DNS name (specific or partial)
Distinguished Name (complete or sub-tree constrained)
RFC 822 email address (complete or partially qualified)
IPv4 address (range)
IPv6 address (range)
Key ID (exact match only)
Table 14: IKE supported identities
The list is compiled from RFC4301
F.5 IKE Supported Encoding of Authentication
Data
This section lists the encoding types for IKE supported authentication data—pre-
shared-secret and x.509 certificates.
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Authentication Data Encoding-value
X.509 cert sign 4
CRL 7
raw rsa key 11
hash url x.509 cert 12
hash url x.509 bundle 13
Table 15: IKE supported authentication data encoding
The list is compiled from RFC4301
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